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Article

Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis
of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes
†

††

Sara S. Greene, Parina Patel & Katherine
†††
Porter
INTRODUCTION
Policymakers have long had an affinity for chapter 13 consumer bankruptcy, the “reorganization” option for consumers.
Instead of quick forgiveness of most unsecured debts, consumers enter into three-to-five-year plans to pay back creditors.
Payments are based on available future income, taking into account a debtor’s expenses such as house and car payments. The
idea is appealing both substantively and morally. Creditors get
some or all of their money paid back, and consumers get to
keep assets and take steps to do the right thing with repay-
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ment efforts. More than a million families each year struggle to
1
repay debts in chapter 13 bankruptcy.
The hard facts on chapter 13, however, are difficult to
2
3
mesh with the positive sentiments. Study after study, including this one that relies on the most recent available data, has
found that only about one-third of consumers who enter chapter 13 complete their repayment plans and therefore receive a
4
discharge of remaining unsecured debts. Two out of three consumers dropout before the end of the repayment plan and fail
to get the broad debt relief of a bankruptcy discharge. For a
system that devotes tremendous court resources to chapter 13
bankruptcy and for the bankrupt families that struggle to make
ends meet, this statistic is disappointing. As previous empirical
work has shown, most of the debtors who drop out of chapter 13
almost immediately start struggling with the same financial
problems they had before filing for bankruptcy, often within
1. Table F-2, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-2/
statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2015/12/31 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). With
301,705 new Chapter 13 filings for 2015, and chapter 13 cases lasting up to
five years, we conservatively estimate there are 500,000 pending chapter 13
cases in the United States.
2. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Who Uses Chapter 13?, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
269, 273 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen et al. eds., 2003) (“The ideological marketing of Chapter 13 appears to be in sharp contrast with practical realities
facing the debtors.”).
3. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER
CREDIT IN AMERICA 17, 217 (1989) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, WARREN &
WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS] (estimating that one-third of
1529 chapter 13 cases in their study completed plan payments); Gordon
Bermant & Ed Flynn, Measuring Projected Performance in Chapter 13: Comparisons Across the States, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2000, at 22, 22
(stating that chapter 13 completion rates hover nationally at about one-third
of confirmed plans); Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education
in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 557, 571 (2001) (reporting five judicial districts’ chapter 13 completion rates in 1994, which ranged from 18.2% to 54.9%); Henry E. Hildebrand III, Administering Chapter 13—At What Price?, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
July/Aug. 1994, at 16, 16 (reporting that chapter 13 trustees estimated a completion rate of 32.89% based on their experiences); Scott Norberg & Andrew J.
Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39
CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 476 (2006) (reporting a 33% discharge rate in sevendistrict sample); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice:
Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 411 (1994) (stating that the
national average reported rate in 1993 for completed cases was 31%).
4. See infra Table 1 (reporting that among a national sample of cases
filed in 2007, 36.5% of chapter 13 cases did not received a discharge).
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5

just weeks of the dismissal. The help from bankruptcy was
6
temporary; only completing the bankruptcy repayment plan
could ensure that property such as a home was kept from creditors and that creditors did not return to dunning and debt col7
lection.
Despite this enduring reality, there has never been a national study of chapter 13 plan completion that applies statistical methods to predict a debtor’s success in chapter 13. This
8
study is the first. Its findings upset longstanding assumptions
5. Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 112 (2011).
6. Id. (“The data show that families temporarily accomplished these
goals during the time they were in Chapter 13. . . . Once their cases were dismissed, the relief quickly evaporated.”).
7. Id. at 162 (“Nearly all of the two in three families that file Chapter 13
and later drop out of their repayment plans do so in precarious financial
straits. The majority of homeowners seem poised to lose their homes, and families are already experiencing an uptick in collection pressure.”).
8. A few of the plan completion studies cited in note 3, supra, have gone
further and attempted an empirical analysis of the factors that are associated
with plan completion. For the reasons noted below, none of these studies had
nearly the scope of sample (national and random), richness of data (debtor
surveys, court records, and district practices), and statistical sophistication
(logistic regression and theory-driven modeling) of this Article. Because of the
constraints of the prior work, only sharply limited inferences from the findings
were possible. See Braucher, supra note 3, at 579 (reporting results from regression analysis using four independent variables that reflected district-wide
practices and one variable at the case-level, and cautioning that “[r]elevant
variables such as individual debtor characteristics that could affect income
and expenses over the course of the plan may predict completion rates far better than this analysis, which explains less than 10 percent of the variance”);
David A. Evans & Jean M. Lown, Predictors of Chapter 13 Completion Rates:
The Role of Socioeconomic Variables and Consumer Debt Type, 29 J. FAM.
ECON. ISSUES 202 (2008) (using a sample drawn solely from cases filed in
Utah, with no survey data on debtors’ demographics and reasons for filing,
and no ability to measure variation across districts because of single-district
design); Scott Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical
Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 415 (1999) (using comparative tests (t-tests and chi-square tests) rather
than regression to predict outcomes from court record (non-survey) data on
seventy-one case samples from a single judicial district, the Southern District
of Mississippi); Norberg & Velkey, supra note 3, at 475, 479–82 (conducting
tests of comparison or correlation (chi-square and t-tests) on variables drawn
from court records on a sample of cases from seven judicial districts located in
five states, which the authors characterized as “national study”). In our view,
Norberg and Velkey’s study is the most comprehensive prior to ours. We respectfully disagree with the authors’ characterization that their sample is “national,” given its approximate half-dozen or so judicial districts. See infra Part
I (reporting that our sample was randomly selected from cases filed in all
states and judicial districts and contains cases from eighty-one of the ninety
judicial districts in the United States).
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and challenge prior research on how bankruptcy works. Indeed,
only when we know what might set apart the minority of successful debtors can we design changes that could fix the broken
bankruptcy system.
While it may be hard to believe that there has never been a
study such as ours of chapter 13 success, a key reason is data
limitations. Even with advances in technology, our study necessarily involved hand coding hundreds of variables and administering surveys. Data available from the required bankruptcy
9
forms, which are much easier to collect electronically, simply
cannot create a convincing model with adequate relevant variables. Robust effects also require careful model building such
as awareness of collinearity and variable construction. But it is
not just a lack of data or statistical analyses that has created
the gap in knowledge. Several misperceptions about bankruptcy have contributed to a perception that our goal of predicting
success in chapter 13 bankruptcy was either impossible or elusive.
We believe that a misinterpretation of an idea that took
hold over thirty years ago, when leading scholars Teresa Sullivan, (now-Senator) Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook introduced the concept of “local legal culture” to bankruptcy
10
scholarship, has retarded certain research questions. Local legal culture is the theory that even when the formal law is the
same or similar across locations, perceptions, expectations,
11
practice variation, and beliefs can change the reality of law. In
their seminal piece, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook argued
that “local legal culture exercises a pervasive, systematic influence on the operation of the federal bankruptcy system” and
9. The official bankruptcy forms mandate a petition for relief and over a
dozen “schedules” of assets, debts, income, and expenses. Bankruptcy Forms,
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms (last visited
Nov. 30, 2016). These forms are filed under penalty of perjury. Id.
10. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The
Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal
Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801 (1994). The theory of “local
legal culture” was initially used as a residual explanation for variations in
chapter 13 outcomes that the researchers’ data could not otherwise explain.
Id.
11. Id. at 804 (defining local legal culture as “systematic and persistent
variations in local legal practices as a consequence of a complex of perceptions
and expectations shared by many practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and differing in identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and
expectations existing in other localities subject to the same or a similar formal
legal regime”).
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pointed to variations in chapter 13 practice as an example of
12
such effects. They argued that future research should be sensitive to local legal culture and that analysis of the bare law
13
was insufficient.
The original theory of local legal culture, which calls on researchers to be aware of regional variations and to account for
14
them in their statistical analyses, gradually morphed into an
explanation for why the persistently poor outcomes in bankruptcy could not be rigorously examined. For example, in response to data about the dismal discharge rates in chapter 13,
the reply would be: rely on the widespread variation in dis15
charge rates to argue that chapter 13 can work. Actors in the
bankruptcy system report that “their districts” are different in
numerous and unseen ways, arguing that unless the research
studied their local, impliedly better way of doing things, a
16
study’s findings were unpersuasive.
This Article rejects this analytical approach as an overly
expansive application of the theory of local legal culture—one
that its original proponents, dyed-in-the-wool empiricists themselves—undoubtedly never intended. Indubitably, differences
based on local practice are aspects of the system. We can respond to local differences in practice, in debtor demographics,
and in other variations in this Article because our comprehensive data collection and analysis have allowed us to do two key
things: (1) control for judicial district variation in our models;
and (2) test local practices in chapter 13 that are often relied on
to explain differences in outcomes.
Additionally, we can assess a host of other previously hypothesized, but never tested, potential predictors of who fares
well in chapter 13. Indeed, in this Article, we return to the sci12. Id. at 806.
13. Id. at 857–65.
14. Id.
15. See Porter, supra note 5, at 109 (describing benefits of chapter 13 other than discharge); William C. Whitford, Small Ball, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
9, 12 (2011) (noting that uses of chapter 13 vary dramatically by judicial district).
16. Porter, supra note 5, at 153; see Robin R. Randolph, Chapter 13: Getting to Completion, CONSIDER CHAPTER 13 (June 19, 2016), http://
considerchapter13.org/2016/06/19/chapter-13-getting-to-completion (disagreeing with critics of chapter 13 and arguing that “deeper study, however, of
chapter 13 plan completion rates at the federal judicial district level reveals
successes that should be duplicated in every district” and offering up “cooperation and collegiality” as an example of a local best practice that can influence
debtor outcomes).
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entific approach that Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook pioneered to understand bankruptcy. We use comprehensive handgathered data, contextual knowledge of bankruptcy law and its
practice, and robust statistical modeling to study chapter 13
outcomes. Our analysis is the first to combine these three approaches despite the lamentations about chapter 13. Our rich
data come from a national sample, the 2007 Consumer Bank17
ruptcy Project of 770 chapter 13 cases. It is also the only national data set that has comprehensive demographic characteristics about filers.
Some of our most important findings revolve around what
does not predict debt reduction in bankruptcy. Wage orders and
payment of mortgages by trustees through repayment plans,
both features that some herald as best practices and are proffered as explanations for why certain districts outperform oth18
ers, are not determinants of completing a chapter 13 case.
Our findings about what does predict bankruptcy outcomes
are disquieting. Blacks have less than half the chance of bank19
ruptcy success as non-blacks; this worsens the recent insight
that blacks are overrepresented in bankruptcy because of at20
torney steering to chapter 13. More than amount of debt, prior
bankruptcies, or having a job—all features that the bankruptcy
system does account for in considering a person’s eligibility for
chapter 13—race matters.
Debtors with young children also have a reduced likelihood
21
of bankruptcy debt relief. And the more dependent children
the person has, the less likely bankruptcy will work to right the
22
family financially. We link these findings to the expense instability and income volatility that are associated with young
23
children. Similarly, we find a correlation between medical insurance coverage and success in bankruptcy, probably due to
its role in buffering expenses that can derail repaying credi24
tors.

17. See infra note 34.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. Tara Siegel Bernard, Blacks Face Bias in Bankruptcy, Study Suggests,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at A1.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part II.D.
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As previous research has suggested, attorneys also matter
in chapter 13. Outcomes for debtors without an attorney are
particularly grim as they face a likely probability of discharge
25
well below ten percent. This has profound policy implications
for policymakers, particularly in light of the increased push for
26
“self-help” in the legal system.
Finally, homeownership is a key factor in determining suc27
cess. The less affordable someone’s housing is, given his or her
28
income, the less likely he or she is to succeed in chapter 13.
Further, a person who reports preventing foreclosure as a reason for seeking bankruptcy is less likely to succeed than someone who entered chapter 13 for any other reason. This finding
calls into question the efficacy of chapter 13 as a home-saving
29
device. Entering chapter 13 to preserve a home—precisely one
of its vaunted benefits compared to the chapter 7 liquidation
alternative—predisposes a debtor to exiting bankruptcy with30
out a discharge of unsecured debt. Combining this finding
with Porter’s prior work that most debtors who exit chapter 13
do not save their homes—they only delay an inevitable foreclo31
sure —is a serious impeachment of the current tools in chapter
32
13 for ailing struggling homeowners.
25. See Angela Littwin, The Do-It-Yourself Mirage Complexity in the
Bankruptcy System, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS
157, 166 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (reporting that in a 2007 Consumer
Bankruptcy Project sample, 91.3% of chapter 13 pro se cases were dismissed
before confirmation).
26. James Greiner et al., Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2016) (“A significant part of the access to justice toolkit must include self-help
materials.”). For a description of a particular self-help intervention in the consumer debt context, see generally Dalie Jimenez et al., Improving the Lives of
Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control Trial: A Research and Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 449 (2013)
(“[D]escrib[ing] a proposed [Randomized Control Trial] to evaluate two interventions that are part of contemporary attempts to assist consumers in financial distress, one from legislators and the other from legal services providers.”).
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See John Eggum et al., Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability and Loan Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1141 (describing as
“grim” the finding that fewer than three in ten homeowners in chapter 13
bankruptcy had affordable housing costs).
29. But see Mark R. Lindblad et al., Bankruptcy During Foreclosure:
Home Preservation Through Chapters 7 and 13, 25 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 41,
61 (2015) (finding that bankruptcy, particularly chapter 13 bankruptcy, reduces the likelihood of foreclosure).
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. Porter, supra note 5, at 147–48; see also Lindblad et al., supra note 29,
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In this Article, we further discuss these findings and other
significant determinants of chapter 13 success. In Part I, we
describe the methodology. In Part II, we present multiple,
debtor-level models to predict outcomes in chapter 13 from a
random national sample. We construct four different models
based on existing empirical literature, theories of bankruptcy
law and family economic security, and law reform ideas. The
first model examines financial characteristics. The second model analyses demographic variables. The third model tests case
procedures. The fourth model estimates the influence of factors
that contribute to a household’s economic security.
We test each model using logistic regression, with a binary
positive outcome of a debtor receiving a chapter 13 discharge.
We use random effects, a statistical tool, to control for unobservable or unmeasurable effects at the level of judicial districts. The models identify several predictors of chapter 13
completion—and suggest some areas where prior assumptions
about how to improve chapter 13 for debtors may be misplaced.
For example, we are unable to find support for the idea that increased strictures by trustees related to wages or mortgage
payments help debtors.
In Part III, the predictors from the four separate models
retain statistical significance in a final model. We discuss the
theoretical significance of the final model predictors and discuss how they contribute to understanding the various forces
and actors that shape bankruptcy outcomes. Part IV of the Article explores how our findings support the need for reform to
bankruptcy law and policy. We identify some specific changes
for consideration, based on our findings, and also develop a
blueprint for further theoretical and empirical study.
Chapter 13 is a cornerstone of the bankruptcy system. We
need accurate information about why the majority of millions of
families that seek chapter 13’s refuge will not achieve the debt
relief of a discharge. Revisions and changes based on empirical
at 52, tbl.3 (reporting that of those who filed bankruptcy after a foreclosure
was started, approximately half have either lost their home to foreclosure or
the house remains in foreclosure despite months or years elapsing since the
bankruptcy).
32. Chapter 13 allows debtors to cure missed past payments over time but
expressly prohibits reducing the principal or making other modifications to the
going-forward terms of the loan. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (b)(5) (2012). See generally Eggum et al., supra note 28, at 1154–64 (summarizing history, rationale, and possible reforms of treatment of home mortgages in chapter 13
cases).
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data from a national sample can direct us to reforms of chapter
13 practice that are likely to be helpful across the country. At
stake is improved access to the fresh start of a bankruptcy discharge and a legal system that delivers the help that families
need to right themselves financially.
I. METHODOLOGY
In this Part, we detail our methods. We describe the sample, the construction of the dependent variable, and the logistic
regression analysis. Given our interest in untangling the influence of local legal culture on case outcomes, we made sure we
had a geographically widespread, national sample of cases. We
also used statistical methods to control for district-level effects
that might influence whether debtors receive a discharge.
A. 2007 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT
The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (“CBP”) is a part
of an iterative study on people who file bankruptcy. The first
CBP was conducted in 1981, with subsequent studies conducted
in 1991, 2001, and 2007. Another CBP study is ongoing with
33
data collection having begun in 2013. The 2007 version of the
CBP is the first national random sample of households that
filed for bankruptcy following the changes to the consumer
34
bankruptcy law in 2005. The investigators believed that the
bankruptcy system had stabilized sufficiently following the effective date of the law in October 2005 to make 2007 cases fair35
ly representative of the likely future cases.
33. The principal investigators in this study, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, and Deborah K. Thorne, are also coding court records and surveying debtors. These data will not be available for analysis of chapter 13 completion until at least five years from filing dates when the repayment plan terms
have ended. The data in this Article, from cases filed in 2007, is the most current available, as data collection could not be completed until 2013. We needed
to allow six years, as some cases did not begin five-year repayment plans until
one year after the filing date.
34. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
35. Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A.E.
Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform
Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 354
(2008) [hereinafter Lawless et al., Bankruptcy Reform] (“These trends led us to
conclude that 2007 would yield a representative data pool of post-BAPCPA
cases . . . .”). While we agree, we also note that the depth of the foreclosure crisis in 2008 and continuing changes in household balance sheets could have
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Data from this Article come from the 2007 Consumer
Bankruptcy Project (hereinafter all references to the “CBP” will
refer to the 2007 version unless otherwise noted) and subsequent follow-up data collected on the initial 2007 sample. The
sample for the 2007 CBP was drawn from a national random
sample of bankruptcy filers using the Automated Access to
36
Court Electronic Records (AACER) system. The sample included chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases from eighty-one of the
37
ninety federal judicial districts. Over a five-week period beginning in the last week of January 2007 through February
2007, 5000 cases were randomly selected from all judicial districts in the United States. The CBP ultimately collected data
on a subset of these randomly selected consumer bankruptcy
filers using information from a written questionnaire, court
records, and telephone interviews (with a subset of 1000 of the
38
sample families).
First, each of the 5000 randomly selected households received a letter from the investigators. The letter briefly described the study and told respondents that if they wanted to
participate, they should complete the survey they would be receiving in the mail. One week after they received the introductory letter, potential participants received a questionnaire
packet. The packet included a cover letter, an eight-page questionnaire, a stamped return envelope, and two dollars in cash
as a token of appreciation. Potential participants were sent a
thank you/reminder letter one week after the initial questionnaire was sent and the research team contacted respondents
via telephone (when the respondents’ telephone numbers were
available) to follow-up. A second reminder was sent one month
produced some meaningful changes in the chapter 13 population. That said,
the most recent data suggest similar demographic and financial profiles for
2007 and 2013–14 bankruptcy filers. See Robert Lawless, Katherine Porter &
Deborah Thorne, Struggling to Bankruptcy (May 16, 2016) (unpublished paper) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Lawless et al., Struggling to Bankruptcy].
36. Automated Access to Court Electronic Records (“AACER”) is now part
of EPIQ Systems. The 2007 national filing data were supplied through the
generous assistance of Mike Bickford and his colleagues at AACER, a bankruptcy data and management company.
37. The sample does not include cases filed in the judicial districts of
Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, or the Virgin Islands.
38. For a complete description of the CBP methodology, see Lawless et al.,
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 35, at 387–405. The CBP phone interview data
was not used for this study and thus a detailed explanation of the methodology
for that part of the study is not included in this Article.
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after the initial questionnaire was mailed, with an additional
two dollars as a token of appreciation encouraging participation. In July 2007, final letters were sent to respondents who
had not yet completed the questionnaire.
The response rate on the surveys was roughly 50%, yielding a total sample of 2521. Investigators analyzed court record
data from non-respondents to test whether they were statisti39
cally distinguishable from respondents, and they were not.
Two-thirds (66%) of the sample was chapter 7 bankruptcies,
40
while the remaining 34% were chapter 13 bankruptcies. Approximately 70% of the returned questionnaires were single fil41
ings and 30% were joint filings (filings by married couples).
Court records for all debtors who responded to the written
questionnaire were obtained using the federal government’s
electronic court record system, PACER. For every case, the
docket sheet, petition, financial schedules, Statement of Financial Affairs, and Statement of Intention were downloaded from
the public records. These forms were coded to obtain information on roughly 200 additional variables. These variables included financial information about debtors and their house42
holds and about case outcomes. Further details on the 2007

39. Specifically, to test for response bias, CBP researchers coded and analyzed major financial variables from the court records of 100 non-respondent
debtors (people who did not return questionnaires and therefore did not participate in the study). Income, debts, assets, monthly expenses, and prior bankruptcy status were some of the financial variables that were included in the
analysis. This data was compared with data collected from the participants
who constituted the core random sample. The analysis suggested that respondents and non-respondents shared similar characteristics on major financial variables and thus that there was no significant sample bias. Lawless et
al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 35, at 396.
40. According to government data, out of all non-business bankruptcy filings, approximately 62.3% are chapter 7, and the remaining 37.7% are chapter
13. The chapter 7 filings in this CBP sample seem somewhat overrepresented.
To adjust for the inflation in chapter 7 filings, the investigators weight the
sample size.
41. The percentage of joint and single filers in the CBP sample is representative of the population of consumer bankruptcy filers. In 2007, approximately 29% of bankruptcy filers filed a joint petition and the remainder filed a
single petition.
42. The court records were coded by trained law students. The training
included reading a thirty-eight-page coding manual and a supervised practice
coding session with one chapter 7 and one chapter 13 case. To test reliability,
10% of the court records were randomly selected a second time for recoding.
These selected cases were compared to the original coding and checked for discrepancies and errors. An error rate of 0.8% was reported.
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CBP, including its funding and acknowledgements of assis43
tance, are available in prior published work.
B. OUTCOMES FROM CHAPTER 13
This study focused on the chapter 13 CBP sample. Chapter
44
13 plans may be five years in duration. This runs from the
time of plan confirmation, which itself may follow the chapter
13 filing by several months. Our goal was to record the final
outcome in all chapter 13 cases, so we updated the outcomes in
March 2013. This is a minimum of six years from initial peti45
tion date. For three cases, we were unable to categorize the
46
outcome. These cases were excluded from the sample.
The table below displays the distribution of outcomes. In
our sample of cases filed in 2007, the chapter 13 discharge rate
was slightly higher (36.5%) than the “one-third” statistic that
47
has endured for decades. While the Bankruptcy Reform Abuse
& Consumer Protection Act of 2005—as well as the foreclosure
crisis—may have increased the chapter 13 completion rate in
the intervening years since 2007, even the most generous statistics suggest that about half of chapter 13 cases are dismissed
without a discharge, most commonly for failure of the debtor to
48
make the required plan payments.

43. For a complete description of the CBP methodology, see Lawless et al.,
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 35, at 387–98.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2012).
45. Lawless et al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 35, at 391.
46. These cases were closed but neither discharged nor dismissed. Reasons could include that a debtor failed to complete the required debtor education or was not otherwise eligible for a discharge but the case was never subject to a motion to dismiss. It was administratively closed.
47. See Norberg & Velkey, supra, note 3.
48. Table BAPCPA 6 – Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) (December 31, 2015) U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts
.gov/statistics/table/bapcpa-6/bankruptcy-abuse-prevention-and-consumer
-protection-act-bapcpa/2015/12/31 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). This report captures all the cases closed in a given one-year period, not the outcomes of cases
filed in a particular moment in time. The difference in method could produce a
substantial difference because cases closed in 2015 could have been filed as
early as 2009, while many dismissed cases are likely to have been filed more
recently. This is an effect of plan completion taking three to five years, so by
definition the completed cases were filed at least a few years ago. Dismissed
cases could have been filed only months before the 2015 case closed report was
created.
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Table 1: Chapter 13 Outcomes of Cases in 2007 Sample
Percentage

Number

Dismissed, pre-confirmation

17.3

134

Dismissed, post-confirmation

35.7

276

Converted, pre-confirmation

1

8

Converted, post-confirmation

8.5

66

Pending, plan confirmed

.5

4

Discharged in chapter 13

36.5

282

Total

100

770

To create a binary variable for regression analysis, we recoded the outcomes in Table 1 into two categories: discharged
and not discharged. We made the assumption that any pending
cases more than six years from filing would achieve a dis49
charge. The distribution of the dependent variable was 286
cases as “1,” a positive outcome, and 484 as “0,” a negative outcome.
Converted cases could be viewed as a success, since the
conversions were to chapter 7 and nearly all chapter 7 cases
50
end in discharge. On the other hand, conversion is a more
time-consuming and expensive path to discharge than making
an initial chapter 7 filing. While one of us has argued that conversion should be more widely used as a tool to address the
51
struggles of chapter 13, that does not make it an optimal outcome from chapter 13. For simplicity, we chose to use a binary
dependent variable of discharged or not discharged in a chapter
13 case. This meant including cases converted to chapter 7 in
the “not discharged” category, regardless of what happened in
the converted case. We also rejected ordinal regression as con-

49. While it is possible that something could derail such a case, for it to
have been pending at our final coding, such debtors all had confirmed plans
and were in chapter 13 for six years. Sometimes plans are functionally “suspended,” allowing a debtor to skip a payment and add a month to the five-year
plan, such that the actual period of repayment can exceed five years. These
are already debtors who have shown years of capacity to pay in chapter 13,
such that missing a final month or two of payment is highly unlikely.
50. See Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for its Surprising Success, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1933, 1973 tbl. 3a. (2011) (reporting that only 2.5% of chapter 7
cases in random national sample had a negative outcome of dismissal).
51. Porter, supra note 5, at 141.
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verted cases are not “in between” discharge and no discharge in
52
any substantive sense.
Additionally, we estimated regression models with a tripartite dependent variable: dismissed, converted, and discharged. All independent variables remained significant or not
significant as in the logistic regression with the binary outcome. This reinforced our approach of focusing on discharge as
the sole positive outcome of cases initially filed in chapter 13.
That is, the only benefit of a considering converted cases as
separate from dismissed ones would be to reduce the statistical
power of our analysis by subdividing the outcome variable.
A binary outcome variable produced an overall discharge
statistic of 37.14%. It is similar to the discharge rate found in
53
nearly all prior studies of multiple districts.
C. LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Regression is a statistical technique used to understand
the impact of variables of interest on a given outcome. In this
way, researchers can control for the impact of different variables on the key topic of investigation. This Article uses one kind
of regression, logistic regression, to predict the outcome in
chapter 13 cases. Previous work has not used regression models
at the individual case level to make such predictions.
In this Article, we use logistic regression to make prediction estimates of the odds of a chapter 13 discharge compared
to a case ending without discharge.
Additionally, we used random effects to account for the fact
that our data includes filers from eighty-one different districts

52. Cases converted from chapter 13 to chapter 7 will often result in the
quick discharge of unsecured debt, but will lack the debt relief related to
missed payments on secured debts, such as mortgages and car loans. Converted cases are not a halfway outcome such that they could be treated as an intermediate outcome between a fully complete chapter 13 case and a dismissed
chapter 13 case with no discharge at all.
53. See, e.g., Bermant & Flynn, supra note 3 (“Completion rates [for chapter 13 filings] hover nationally at about one-third of confirmed plans . . . .”);
Hildebrand III, supra note 3 (“The trustees estimated that the completion rate
of chapter 13 cases averaged 32.89 percent. This is consistent with conventional wisdom that approximately two-thirds of chapter 13 cases fail to reach
discharge.”); Norberg & Velkey, supra note 3, at 505 (“The overall discharge
rate for the debtors in the seven districts covered by the Project was exactly
the oft-repeated statistic of one-third.”).
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throughout the United States. This technique is appropriate
given the “local legal culture” research suggesting that chapter
13 outcomes and practices vary substantially in different judi54
cial districts. Using random effects creates a hierarchical
model structure that recognizes debtors reside in different judicial districts. Random effects also reflect our interest in making
predictions about chapter 13 discharge to districts not included
in our sample. If we used fixed effects, making out-of-sample
predictions (i.e. making predictions of districts not included in
our sample) is not appropriate since the unit effect for unobserved districts are unknown. Finally, including random effects
allows us to be more confident in the output of our models be55
cause random effects produce higher standard errors. This reduces the likelihood of reporting a statistical significance relationship between two variables when one does not exist, by
56
imposing a higher threshold for the models’ calculations.
II. WHO, WHAT, HOW, AND WHY: DEBTOR AND CASE
DIFFERENCES
This Part describes how we grouped the variables into four
models, each constructed around a theory of what types of factors might relate to the likelihood of discharge. We eschewed
the kitchen-sink approach of including all independent variables in a single analysis. Each model is based on a theory of
what drives chapter 13 outcomes and the empirical knowledge
of the system. Model 1, the Debtor Finances model, uses information that bankruptcy law requires a debtor to provide to the
court, the trustee, and creditors. Model 2 reflects demographic
data (which the law largely deems irrelevant) and which were
collected by written surveys of debtors sent by the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project. Model 3, System Process, reflects variables
that will guide a case process, such as having an attorney, or
using a wage order to collect payments. The final one, Model 4,
Household Security, looks at underlying causes of financial instability.
To a certain extent, the models also use data that generally
were drawn from the same source (required forms, written sur54. Whitford, supra note 15, at 12–13; Whitford, supra note 3 at 408–13.
55. WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 316–17 (5th ed. 2002).
56. See id. at 183; see also ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA
ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 246
(2007) (recommending that researchers “always use” random effects and explaining the primary motivations for using multilevel modeling).
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veys, district-level practices, etc.). This approach to model
building is useful in developing reform ideas for chapter 13
based on our findings. That is, to the extent the estimates suggest that district practices are influential, one might focus reforms on implementing the beneficial practices. Alternatively,
if many highly predictive variables are not collected by required
forms, adding such data may improve chapter 13 counseling
and confirmation decisions.
We supplemented the Consumer Bankruptcy Project data
by gathering additional variables that the prior literature had
suggested might be relevant to discharge. This was particularly
useful in building the models that focus on trustee and court
processes, as the Consumer Bankruptcy Project focused on
debtor characteristics. These additional data give us the new
opportunities for analysis of chapter 13 and permit us to study
interactions between system and debtor characteristics in a
way never before possible.
A. DEBTOR FINANCES MODEL
Bankruptcy is a remedy for those with financial problems,
so an initial model examining how outcomes vary by debt, income, and assets made intuitive sense. This model also bears
the most resemblance to prior analyses. Researchers, beginning
with Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook in the 1980s, collected
these variables and used them to study the functioning of the
57
bankruptcy system. Scott Norberg’s and Andrew Velkey’s
study of chapter 13 is the most expansive example of this ap58
proach, focusing on income and debt characteristics.
For this first model, (hereinafter referred to as the “debtor finances” model for shorthand), the data come from debtors’
petitions and schedules. The petition and schedules serve as a
mirror that reflects the bankruptcy system’s decisions of what
information is necessary for administering cases. The Bankruptcy Code requires the disclosure of information about assets
59
and debts. The determination of what must be paid to creditors reflects a calculation drawn from disclosures about income
60
and expenses.

57. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS,
supra note 3, at 17.
58. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 3.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2012).
60. Id. § 1325(b).
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Trustees review the petition and schedules, and a debtor
must appear at a mandatory meeting to answer questions
61
about the financial characteristics contained therein. The
debtor finances model contains the “quick facts” that are ascertainable in a minute or two of reviewing a debtor’s case file. If
this information meaningfully predicts plan completion, trustees could begin to raise objections to plan confirmation imme62
diately in a case. Similarly, these are the core facts that are
being gathered in client counseling by debtors’ attorneys as
they complete the petition and schedules. All parties have
ready and immediate access to these debtor characteristics.
Another notable attribute of the debtor finances model is
that the variables are highly standardized. The forms are required in all districts. This reflects a degree of consensus about
the importance of these characteristics to a legal system of debt
relief.
1. Predictor Variables
The variables in the debtor finances model reflect the most
important financial characteristics of chapter 13 debtors. We
tested models that included other variables and also checked
63
the variables for collinearity. In joint filings, the debts and net
income reflect the information on both spouses. We also include
the descriptive statistics of all independent variables in the
model in Table 2 below.
a) Net Household Income (in thousands): A continuous
variable that includes income from all sources, both wage and
non-wage, less any payroll deductions from wage income. It includes spousal income in cases when a debtor was married (regardless of whether the bankruptcy was filed jointly or singly).
b) Unsecured Debt Amount (in thousands): A continuous
variable that measures the total of unsecured debts listed on

61. Id. § 341.
62. To confirm a chapter 13 plan, a court must determine that “the debtor
will be able to make all payments under the plan to comply with the plan.” Id.
§ 1325(a)(6). This is called the “feasibility” requirement as it reflects the debtor’s capacity to continue making plan payments for the years of the plan.
63. Tests to see if the data met the assumption of collinearity indicated
that multicollinearity was not a concern (Net Household Income, Tolerance=0.49, VIF=2.06; Unsecured Debt Amount, Tolerance=0.88, VIF=1.13;
Priority Unsecured Debt Amount, Tolerance=0.85, VIF=1.18; Secured Debt
Amount, Tolerance=0.50, VIF=1.99; Unaffordable Housing, Tolerance=0.90,
VIF=1.11).
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64

each debtor’s Schedule F. Any debts entitled to priority repayment, such as domestic support, are not included.
c) Priority Unsecured Debt Amount (in thousands): A continuous variable that represents the total of priority unsecured
debts listed on each debtor’s Schedule E. Only 38% of the sample owed some priority debt. Priority debt includes tax and alimony debt. In the sample, about 31% of the sample had tax
debt and 4% had alimony debt.
d) Secured Debt Amount (in thousands): A continuous variable that measures the total of secured debts on each debtor’s
Schedule D. This includes mortgage debt and car debt.
e) Unaffordable Housing: This variable represents the total amount of housing expenses divided by household gross income. This variable was calculated for both renters and homeowners. Total housing costs include the rent/mortgage payment
and utility payments (electricity, gas, water, etc.). Gross income
was used in calculating the ratio because this is the standard
measure in the housing literature. The resulting housing cost
data were split into three categories and recoded based on the
existing literature on housing affordability. If the debtors spent
0% to 30% of their household income on housing costs, it was
coded as affordable. If the debtors spent between 31% and 50%
of household gross income on housing coasts, it was coded as
unaffordable. If the debtors spent more than 50% of their
household gross income on housing costs, it was coded as se65
verely unaffordable. The higher numerical codes correspond to
more unaffordability, and 69.77% of debtor households had affordable housing.
f) Homeowner: This is a dichotomous variable that reflects
whether a debtor owned a home or did not own a home at the
time of chapter 13 filing. It was recoded from the answers given
in the written survey that asked the debtors to describe their
living situations at the time of filing. If a debtor lived with family or friends, regardless of whether rent was paid, the debtor

64. The bankruptcy schedules in use in 2007 did not make it possible to
readily distinguish what was likely non-dischargeable student loan debt from
other unsecured debts. New forms went into effect in December 2015 that will
permit later researchers to make this distinction and examine student loans in
bankruptcy.
65. For this variable, as the numerical values for each category increase,
housing becomes more unaffordable. In particular, affordable housing is coded
as 0, unaffordable housing is coded as 1, and severely unaffordable housing is
coded as 2.
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was coded as a non-homeowner. Homeowners filed 74% of cases.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Debtor Finances
Model
Min

Max

Median

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Net Household
Income*

0.444

19

3.06

3.46

1.97

Unsecured Debt
Amount*

0

289.18

23.44

35.67

41.55

Priority Unsecured
Debt Amount*

0

318.28

0

3.38

15.45

Secured Debt
Amount*

0

887.48

91.68

119.66

126.93

Unaffordable Housing

0

2

0

0.358

0.59

Home Owner

0

1

1

0.736

0.44

Note: * indicates amount in thousands of U.S. dollars.

1. Regression Results
There were 731 valid cases for the debtor finances model.
The omitted cases were the result of missing data for any one
or more of the variables. For example, a few debtors made only
bare petition or “face sheet” filings and never filed schedules.
Other debtors did not answer the survey question on homeowner status. Zeroes were not considered missing, but rather taken
to be actual numbers. Some debtors simply did not owe any
debts of a certain type; this was common with priority debt, for
example, where the typical debtor did not have any debts entitled to legal priority in repayment.
Table 3 below shows the output from the logistic regression
with random-effects on the judicial district variable. The dependent variable was chapter 13 discharge, which codes all
cases that were discharged as “1.” In addition to the coeffi66
cients from the regression analysis, Table 3 includes the pre-

66. The coefficients represent the likelihood of chapter 13 completion (or
chapter 13 discharge). For positive coefficients, an increase in the independent
variable increases the likelihood of chapter 13 completion. A negative coeffi-
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dicted probabilities of chapter 13 discharge for each variable. It
also includes two predicted probabilities for each variable, each
of which are calculated holding all other variables in the model
at their mean. The first predicted probability for each variable
67
is calculated by subtracting the standard deviation from the
mean, and the second probability for each variable is calculated
68
by adding the standard deviation to the mean. Calculating the
predicted probabilities for variables at the interval of one
standard deviation from the mean in both directions, and then
calculating the difference between these probabilities allows us
to compare the relative relationships of variables to chapter 13
completion.
The variable with the largest difference in predicted probabilities has the most influence on chapter 13 completion.
Therefore, out of all the variables included in the debtor finances model, we found that Unsecured Debt Amount has the largest effect in predicting chapter 13 completion (difference=0.35),
followed by priority debt (difference=0.25), secured debt (difference=0.18), and affordability of housing (difference=0.15).

cient indicates an increase in the independent variable decreases the likelihood of chapter 13 completion. For example, Unsecured Debt Amount has a
positive coefficient, which is interpreted as indicating that increases in the
amount of unsecured debt increases the likelihood of chapter 13 completion.
On the other hand, Unaffordable Housing has a negative coefficient, meaning
the more unaffordable housing becomes (or as the unaffordable housing variable increases) the likelihood of chapter 13 completion decreases.
67. The standard deviation of a variable is a measure of dispersion from
the mean. It is the average (mean) of the spread between each observation and
the average observation (mean).
68. For instance, looking at Table 2, we find that net household income
has a mean of 3.46 and a standard deviation of 1.96. The first predicted probability for net household income was calculated by holding all other variables in
the model equal to their mean and net household income equal to 1.49 (which
equals the mean-standard deviation (“sd”)), and the second predicted probability was calculated holding all other variables in the model equal to their mean
and net household income equal to 5.43 (which is the mean+sd). The predicted
probabilities were calculated for each variable in this way.
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Table 3: Debtor Finances Model
Coefficients

Predicted
Probabilities
(mean-sd)

Predicted
Probabilities
(mean+sd)

Difference in
Predicted
Probabilities

Net
Household
Income

0.05
(0.06)

0.39

0.43

0.04

Unsecured
Debt
Amount

0.02***
(0.00)

0.27

0.59

0.32

-0.04*
(0.01)

0.44

0.30

-0.14

-0.002**
(0.001)

0.50

0.33

-0.17

-0.50***
(0.16)

0.46

0.34

-0.12

0.44

0.40

-0.04

Priority Debt
Amount
Secured
Debt
Amount
Unaffordable
Housing
Homeowner
Constant
Log
Likelihood

-0.22
(0.21)
-0.35
-445.46

Notes: 1) Predicted probabilities represent the predicted probability of discharge for each variable, plus and minus the standard deviation,
holding all other variables in the model constant at their mean.
2) *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
3) Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

2. Interpretation of Findings
The debtor finances model strikes us as most interesting
for the variables that are not significant: income and homeownership. The debt variables have the anticipated associations.
Higher unsecured debts are related to greater likelihood of
discharge. The value of a discharge comes in relation to general
unsecured or priority unsecured debts. The more unsecured
debt that a family has, the greater benefit a discharge will
bring in its financial problems. When there is little or no unsecured debt, a chapter 13 case may be successfully resolved
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without a discharge—at least as theoretical matter. We interpret the correlation between unsecured debt and discharge as
some indication that the anticipated economic incentives created by the legal system to shape real-world outcomes. People
who derive the most relief from completing a chapter 13 plan
are significantly more likely to do so.
Another explanation may exist for why those with large
unsecured debts fare better in chapter 13. General unsecured
debts are required to be paid only if the debtor has disposable
income, and often debtors have little or no such income available. Thus, families achieve real savings inside bankruptcy from
eliminating or reducing monthly minimum payments to unsecured creditors. In turn, this frees up money in the family’s
budget to make payments to secured creditors—a requirement
for completing a plan.
Higher general unsecured debts also do not burden a debtor’s path to chapter 13 success because of bankruptcy law’s requirement that a debtor only make payments on unsecured
debt if he or she has “disposable” income (income remaining af70
ter reasonably necessary expenses). For many debtors, there
is no such disposable income, and a “repayment” plan may actually propose to pay zero to unsecured creditors. Thus, regardless of the dollars of debt, the repayment requirement may
evaporate if a debtor needs all her income to meet expenses.
Having a higher amount of secured debt at bankruptcy is
related to a lower likelihood of discharge (p<0.05). At first
blush, this finding may be surprising. The primary motivation
for most chapter 13 filings, as reported by debtors, is trying to
71
save their homes. Not surprisingly, mortgage debt is the bulk
of secured debt for 74% of the sample who are homeowners. To
be sure, chapter 13 has tools to address difficulty in paying secured debts. For home mortgages, the main tool is the right to
cure a delinquency on a home mortgage by spreading the repayment of the arrears over many months or years. For other
secured debts, such as automobile loans, the debtor may be able
to reduce the secured debt to the value of the collateral.

69. See Porter, supra note 5, at 149–52 (discussing the challenge that
chapter 13 households face in achieving their goals without a discharge because most dismissed cases result in the immediate resumption of debt collection activities).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2012).
71. Porter, supra note 5, at 135–36.

2017]

CRACKING THE CODE

1053

The available research suggests that these tools, however
remarkable they may strike a non-bankruptcy specialist, are
72
simply too weak to rehabilitate debtors. The lien or mortgage
73
remains attached to the collateral in bankruptcy, meaning
that if debtors cannot make the monthly payments due, the
creditor can repossess and foreclose. When the car or home is
expensive, vis-a-vis a debtor’s income and other expenses, the
debtor may simply be unable to make the loan payments. When
a debtor misses one or more payment, a creditor will file a motion for the bankruptcy court’s permission to repossess or foreclose on the collateral. At that point—realizing that a creditor
will soon take ownership of their cars, homes, or other assets,
many debtors give up on bankruptcy entirely. They cease to
make any payments at all under the plan—even those that do
not relate to the collateral asset. The result is that the debtor’s
bankruptcy ends, with the trustee to then file a motion to dismiss the case. Prior research using interviews with debtors
whose cases did not achieve a discharge documented this pat74
tern. What appears on the court docket as a dismissal for the
debtor’s failure to make chapter 13 plan payments (distributed
to unsecured creditors) is actually driven by a debtor’s refusal
to continue with bankruptcy when the ongoing secured loan
cannot be paid and the car, house, or asset will be forfeited to
the lender.
We tested this idea further by constructing and including a
variable that assessed housing costs as a fraction of a debtor’s
income. Renters, like homeowners, face eviction, despite being
in chapter 13, if they do not make their ongoing monthly obligations. Housing cost is a better measure of the way in which a
family’s shelter obligations may influence chapter 13 completion than a binary look at homeownership. As the regression
shows, homeownership itself is not statistically significant.

72. Id. at 112–13.
73. Mortgage liens may be eliminated in bankruptcy in a few situations.
Least commonly—but most cleanly—if a lien would be invalid against a hypothetical bona fide purchaser of the property or a hypothetical judgment creditor, then the lien is invalid. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012). Junior mortgage liens that
are wholly unsecured (that is, the collateral value is less than the senior lien)
may be eliminated with appropriate language and completion of the debtor’s
chapter 13 plan. Some courts require a discharge, rather than simply plan
completion, but all require the completion of plan payments as a prerequisite
to strip off a wholly unsecured mortgage lien.
74. See Porter, supra note 5.
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Some people who file chapter 13 own their homes outright with
no mortgage, and others are deeply underwater with multiple
liens. A binary homeownership variable masks the tremendously different financial consequences of homeownership between
those who have no mortgage, modest mortgages, and expensive
mortgages.
Housing cost burdens, which can be calculated for both
renters and homeowners, are a measure of the available fraction of income taken for housing. Because most people are unable or reluctant to move quickly, these housing cost burdens
limit the flexibility to deal with unexpected peaks in expenses
or troughs in income. The added burden of a chapter 13 plan
payment as a fixed expense only increases the dollars that are
earmarked in a family’s budget and so unavailable to meet varying expenses.
Prior research has demonstrated the high housing cost
burdens of chapter 13 debtors. In a study of chapter 13 debtors
who filed in 2005, Eggum, Porter, and Twomey reported that
71% of cases had unaffordable or severely unaffordable home75
ownership costs. That sample was limited to homeowners liv76
ing in states that permit non-judicial foreclosure. The sample
used here is national and includes renters and homeowners.
Our analysis found that 30% of cases were filed by households
burdened with unaffordable or severely unaffordable housing.
This is actually slightly lower than the national rate; in 2015,
the “share of cost-burdened households . . . [was] 34.1 per77
cent.”
Our results find that as housing becomes more unaffordable, the likelihood of chapter 13 completion decreases. People in
bankruptcy who must meet rent, mortgage, and utility payments have little ability to shoulder the additional burdens of
chapter 13 with regard to plan payments. Because of the dire
and rapid consequences of a default on rent, mortgage, or utility payments, this is a difficult expense to defer in order to meet
chapter 13 plan payment deadlines. Faced either with case
dismissal or eviction/foreclosure/utility shut-off, people often let
the chapter 13 case end. Even in cases in which the plan payment to unsecured creditors is zero, an unaffordable housing
75. Eggum et al., supra note 28, at 1142.
76. Id. at 1133.
77. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2015, at 30 (2015) (defining “cost-burdened” as households
paying in excess of 30% of income for housing).
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burden means that making regular mortgage payments is a big
stretch. If saving a home was the primary goal of the chapter
13 bankruptcy, then either missed mortgage payments or
missed trustee payments may doom the case. When a debtor
fails to make required plan payments, the case will be dismissed without a discharge.
Income is an important predictor of many phenomena. Yet,
in chapter 13, the absolute amount of income is largely irrelevant as debtors are required to commit all excess “disposable
78
income” to their repayment plans. Having a higher income
does not require larger plan payments if a debtor’s expenses
are correspondingly larger. Bankruptcy law effectively imposes
a 100% “tax” on any additional income that exceeds expenses in
chapter 13. The models did not estimate any independent effect
of income amount in predicting plan completion.
A positive interpretation of this finding is that it suggests
that chapter 13 bankruptcy works about equally well for lowerincome people as for higher-income people. In a legal system in
79
which income inequality drives many results, bankruptcy is
notable as a counterexample. While all debtors must have some
amount of regular income to qualify for chapter 13, the estimates suggest that even those with a modest amount of income
can achieve a discharge.
B. DEBTOR DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL
Across many areas, the outcomes of a social or legal process are associated with demographic characteristics of its users. This dynamic is particularly apparent in the criminal justice context; it is well established, for example, that young,
black and Latino males involved in the criminal justice system
have historically received longer sentences than comparably
80
situated white males. Further, in some jurisdictions and in
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2012).
79. See DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004) (providing a booklength treatment of Rhode’s argument); Deborah Rhode, Whatever Happened
to Access to Justice, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 882 (2009) (“Unrealistic income
eligibility ceilings, typically set at 125 percent of the poverty line, . . . exclude
many individuals who cannot realistically afford counsel. As a consequence,
millions of Americans lack access to the legal system.” (citations omitted)).
80. TUSHAR KANSAL, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITY IN
SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 7 (2005); see also Cassia Spohn &
David Holleran, The Imprisonment Penalty Paid by Young, Unemployed Black
and Hispanic Male Offenders, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 281, 299–301 (2000) (extending a previous study conducted in Pennsylvania, and concluding that in addi-
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the federal system, “minority defendants [are] more likely to
81
receive a death sentence than white defendants.” The theory
of the debtor demographic model is that households in bankruptcy would follow the same basic trends: better outcomes
(here, more likelihood of discharge) for people who are better
educated, non-minority race, married, and working in higher
social status jobs.
While repeated studies have shown that people in bankruptcy are demographically similar to a broadly defined middle
82
class of Americans, that “middle class” finding does not mean
there is not variance in demographic characteristics. Our data
set is big enough to allow us to measure whether social and
personal qualities, rather than financial characteristics (Debtor
Finances Model), of individuals are associated with success in
chapter 13. The CBP data gather over two dozen demographic
characteristics for each filer, none of which are collected by the
Official Bankruptcy Forms. Testing this model using our data
can give insights that are not available to the most researchers,
who are limited to administrative data.
This debtor demographic theory is particularly important
to test because of recent research showing that race is perhaps
the single best predictor of whether a person files chapter 13
83
instead of chapter 7. Blacks are twice as likely to file chapter
13, even when controlling for homeownership and other legal,
84
geographic, and socioeconomic factors. This groundbreaking
tion to Pennsylvania, young black and Hispanic males are more likely than
middle-aged white offenders to be sentenced to prison in Chicago, Miami, and
Kansas City); Gene Demby, Study Reveals Worse Outcomes for Black and Latino Defendants, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 17, 2014), http://www.npr.org/
sections/codeswitch/2014/07/17/332075947/study-reveals-worse-outcomes-for
-black-and-latino-defendants (reporting the findings of the Vera Institute for
Justice, which examined more than 2,220,000 Manhattan cases over a twoyear period and found that “race still played ‘a statistically significant independent factor’ in how a given case was handled at almost every stage”).
81. KANSAL, supra note 80, at 14; see also Richard R.W. Brooks & Steven
Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy Relationship Between
Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
609, 610 (2002) (“Our analysis also reveals a consistent pattern of harsher outcomes correlated with the race of the defendant.”).
82. Elizabeth Warren & Deborah Thorne, A Vulnerable Middle Class:
Bankruptcy and Class Status, in BROKE, supra note 50, at 25, 25–26.
83. See Jean Braucher et al., Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy
Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 393 (2012) (“Even after controlling for financial, demographic, and legal factors . . . African Americans are
much more likely to file chapter 13, as compared to debtors of other races.”).
84. Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Less Forgiven: Race and Chapter 13
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finding is a powerful reminder that although the written law
may be race-neutral, the system may not function that way. We
were interested in whether other demographic qualities, such
as age, also were associated with the likelihood of discharge.
Here again, our model is based on research. The proportion of
older Americans, particularly those in their seventies and old85
er, in increasing sharply. Our analysis looks at whether they
fare differently after seeking debt relief.
1. Predictor Variables
Each of the variables comes from the 2007 CBP’s written
86
survey. These variables were collected for each person, meaning that there are data for two people in dual-headed house87
holds. To illustrate, if a case was filed by a forty-five-year-old
man with a high school degree and a thirty-year-old woman
with a college degree, the household was assigned an age of forty-five years and an education level of college degree. While
there are certainly other valid approaches, none of our testing
suggested a difference in results. As a matter of theory, we
think a household has the benefit and burdens of the person
with the “most” of a particular quality (that is, if only one person has a college degree, the household still has that benefit
over a household with two lesser-educated people).
a) Marital Status: The survey allowed participants to reveal their marital status in some detail, such as by indicating
widowed, single (never married), divorced, etc. We made the
variable dichotomous, reflecting whether an adult who was
currently married filed the bankruptcy or not. A case filed by a
married person was coded as a “1.” Of the cases, 51% had a
88
married person as a debtor.
Bankruptcy, in BROKE 176, 181 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012).
85. John A.E. Pottow, The Rise in Elder Bankruptcy Filings and Failure
of U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 19 ELDER L.J. 119, 120 (2011); see also Deborah
Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Increasing Vulnerability
of Older Americans: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Court, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 87, 88 (2009) (“The average age for filing bankruptcy has increased, and
the rate of bankruptcy fillings among those ages sixty-five and older has more
than doubled since 1991.”).
86. Lawless et al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 35, at 391.
87. The survey asked for information on both adults living in a household,
regardless of whether the bankruptcy filing itself was made jointly or only one
adult in a married couple had filed.
88. Bankruptcy petitions may be either single or joint, the latter being an
option only for married couples. But a married person may file a single petition. This variable is drawn from the survey, which asked the debtor to report
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b) Household Age: This continuous variable reflected the
age of the oldest filer (or their non-filing spouse in a non-joint
case filed by a married couple).
c) Household Education: This ordinal variable allowed respondents to indicate the highest education they had obtained,
with a “0” being no high school diploma/no GED, and “7” being
a doctorate or professional degree. The two largest categories
were 23.5% selected high school graduate or GED and 24% selected one or more years of college but no college degree. Only
one in five households had one or more adults with a bachelor’s
89
degree or higher.
d) Household Occupational Prestige: Occupational prestige
is an “indication of one’s ability to demand and receive defer90
ence and opportunities . . . .” Successive surveys over decades
measure the status that people associate with particular occupations. For example, a hair stylist has a prestige score of 33; a
91
physician has a score of 84. Income and education are corre92
lated, but there are exceptions.
e) Self-Employment: Unlike age, education, and occupational prestige, we categorized a household as being selfemployed if either of the adults reported being self-employed.
This decision reflects two conclusions. First, as a theoretical
matter, we think a household with even one self-employed person has some characteristics that distinguish it from a household with two traditional wage earners. For example, selfemployed people bear more responsibility for tax withholding,
may have more experience with borrowing, and may have less
stable total household income due to fluctuations in the selfemployed person’s work. Second, there were not enough households with two self-employed people to merit a separate category. Among all cases, 21% had one or two self-employed adults.
In this dichotomous variable “1” reflects self employment.
f) Race (black): The survey asked respondents if they were
a member of one or more racial or ethnic groups. Information
current marital status. So regardless of whether the case was single or joint,
the data reflect the case composition—half of all cases are filed by one or more
married adults.
89. The education variable is coded as follows: (0) Some education, no diploma/GED; (1) High school graduate or GED equivalent; (2) Some college
credit but no degree; (3) One or more years of college, but no degree; (4) Associate’s Degree; (5) Bachelor’s degree; (6) Master’s Degree; (7) Doctorate.
90. Warren & Thorne, supra note 82, at 252 n.19.
91. Id. at 31 (providing examples of occupational prestige scores).
92. Id.
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also was reported on the other person for two-adult households.
Respondents could check all race/ethnicity categories that ap93
plied. Consistent with the empirical research discussed above,
and after testing other approaches, we chose a binary measure
at the household level. If either one or both adults in the
household self-reported being African American/black, then the
94
household was coded as a “1” for black.
e) Minor Dependents: This variable measures the number
of minor dependents in a household under eighteen years of
age. Just over half (53%) of all households had children. Fewer
than 4% of households had four or more dependents.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Debtor Demographic
Model
Min

Max

Median

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Married (1=married)

0

1

1

0.53

0.50

Household Age

21

85

46

46.40

11.49

Race (1=black)

0

1

0

0.34

0.47

Household Education

0

7

3

2.92

1.67

Household Self-Employed

0

1

0

0.22

0.41

Occupational Prestige

12

76

42

41.51

10.58

Number of Minor
Dependents

0

8

1

1.10

1.29

2. Regression Results
There were 640 valid cases for the demographic model.
Cases were dropped when one or more variables was missing.
We had to drop a number of cases in which the debtor indicated
“other” as education, as that response could not be included
when we were treating the educational variable as ordinal. On
the CBP survey, respondents could skip any question. Dropping

93. Braucher et al., supra note 83 (showing that black debtors, but not
other ethnic and racial groups, are disproportionately represented in chapter
13 bankruptcy).
94. Very little is known about how those who identify as Hispanic or
Asian (or other ethnic or racial populations) fare in bankruptcy. Generally,
surveys have reported rates of bankruptcy of Hispanic Americans and Asian
Americans that are disproportionately lower than their presence in the general population. Porter, supra note 5, at 129–30 nn.125–27.

1060

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1031

all cases in which one or more variables had missing data resulted in a loss of 118 cases.
Table 5 presents the results from the logistic regression.
Random effects were used to control for the effect of judicial
district. As with the first model, the dependent variable was
the case ending in a chapter 13 discharge as the positive outcome (“1”). The table shows that in this model race plays the
biggest indicator on chapter 13 completion, followed by the
number of minor dependents. In fact, blacks are 17% less likely
to complete chapter 13 over their non-black counterparts.
Table 5: Debtor Demographic Model
Predicted
Probabilities
(mean-sd)

Predicted
Probabilities
(mean+sd)

Difference in
Predicted
Probabilities

0.22
(0.18)

0.40

0.42

0.02

-0.003
(0.008)

0.41

0.40

-0.01

-1.10***
(0.20)

0.48

0.31

-0.17

0.09
(0.05)

0.38

0.43

0.05

-0.22
(0.21)

0.42

0.38

-0.05

-0.002
(0.009)

0.41

0.40

-0.01

-0.23**
(0.08)
-0.06

0.47

0.33

-0.14

Coefficients

Married
(1=married)
Household
Age
Race
(1=black)
Household
Education
SelfEmployed
Occupational
Prestige
Number
of Minor
Dependents
Constant
Log
Likelihood

-405.48

Notes: 1) Predicted probabilities represent the predicted probability of discharge for each variable plus and minus the standard deviation holding all other variables in the model constant at their mean.
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2) *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
3) Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

3. Interpretation of Findings
In general, the model produced estimates in the expected
direction. That is, the independent variables were more or less
likely to predict discharge in a way that aligned with hypotheses. Married couples and households with one or more relatively well-educated people were more likely to complete chapter 13
with a discharge. These are consistent with the idea that education and two adults who can contribute to the household are
financially beneficial. Prior research has also found that joint
filings, which are always married people, are more likely to
95
complete a plan. Married people may file without their spouses, however, and our demographic data allow for a more nuanced look at the effect than relying on the administrative data
of joint or single filings. Our findings from a national sample
are consistent with the single-district (Utah) study that found
96
marital status was positively related to plan completion.
Households with an older adult and with self-employed
workers were both less likely to discharge their debts after
making payments in bankruptcy. Research from the 2007 CBP
has discussed the financial challenges facing older Americans
97
and the self-employed, as both groups are overrepresented in
bankruptcy. They also fare worse in bankruptcy when they do
seek help in chapter 13.
While marriage, education, age, and self-employment have
the expected direction of effect on bankruptcy success, none of
these four variables were statistically significant. We think our
findings confirm the general validity of our sample and analysis but we do not rely on marriage, education, age or selfemployment in our final model as we cannot be reliably certain
that such predictive effects are not the result of chance.
Two demographic factors were predictive of discharge in
chapter 13 and statistically significant: households with one or
more black adults or households having minor children are
95. Norberg & Velkey, supra note 3, at 510.
96. Evans & Lown, supra note 8, at 213.
97. Robert M. Lawless, Striking out on Their Own, the Self-Employed in
Bankruptcy, in BROKE, supra note 50 at 101, 103 (noting that the selfemployed in bankruptcy are usually in an even deeper financial hole than other filers); Pottow, supra note 85, at 144 (finding that elder bankruptcy filers
typically have even lower monthly incomes than younger filers).
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both less likely to finish chapter 13. These findings are troubling because both racial minorities and those with children are
particularly vulnerable to other economic and social risks, such
as facing discrimination in finding housing or securing jobs, de98
spite laws to the contrary.
Households with one or more adults that select black as
part of their racial identities are much more likely to fail to
complete chapter 13. This finding gives real bite to the prior research showing that blacks are much more likely to be in chap99
ter 13 than chapter 7. While those scholars have noted that
chapter 13 is generally more expensive, slower, and more bur100
densome than chapter 7, our data show that blacks also are
less likely to get a discharge in chapter 13 than filers with no
black adults in the household. As an empirical matter, not just
a theoretical one, blacks do not get the debt relief from bankruptcy that non-blacks enjoy.
We caution that correlation is not causation. While we are
confident in the association between being black and not completing chapter 13, our data cannot explain the reason for that
outcome. Several possibilities occur to us based on our
knowledge of the scholarship and the functioning of the bankruptcy system. First, since previous research shows that blacks
101
are being disproportionately steered into chapter 13, it may
be that there are a disproportionate number of blacks in chapter 13 who are steered into it even when it is not suited to their
financial profile. Further, if blacks are more likely to be counseled to file chapter 13 than non-blacks, they may have less interest or commitment to chapter 13 of their own accord. With
less independent interest or desire for chapter 13 (outside of
their attorney’s accord), blacks may be less willing to endure
the long repayment plan. This is a rational reaction that could
reflect a slow realization that a non-bankruptcy or chapter 7
bankruptcy solution would be better, despite their attorney’s
counseling at the time of filing. Second, blacks may encounter
discrimination during the chapter 13 process. No data exist
that permit an analysis of whether trustees’ or judges’ decisions
about chapter 13 may differ by race, controlling for relevant
factors. There may be no such effect, but the Bankruptcy Rules
98. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2015); Equal Opportunity
Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
99. Braucher et al., supra note 83.
100. Cohen & Lawless, supra note 84, at 176.
101. Braucher et al., supra note 83.
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Committee’s refusal to add racial self-identification to the
102
bankruptcy forms makes it impossible to examine the issue.
Finally, blacks may be more likely to have qualities associated
with not completing chapter 13 that we cannot identify because
of data limitations. As an example, our data cannot measure
the risk of chronic disease, but such medical problems could
cause greater income interruptions that hinder chapter 13
completion.
Children are expensive, as the perennial graphics in news103
papers illustrate. Indeed, it is not surprising that the more
children debtors have, the less likely they are to successfully
complete their chapter 13 plan. More children means more
clothes and shoes to buy, more food to provide, greater transportation costs—the list goes on and on. But chapter 13 plans
are supposed to take into account these additional expenses by
allowing a debtor to deduct expenses for dependents, such as
104
day care and additional food allowances.
What chapter 13 plans do not take into account, however,
is the increased risk of financial shock that each additional
child adds to one’s life. Financial shocks are usually considered
unexpected events that result in a loss of income or expenditure
105
paid. Elizabeth Warren’s research has pointed to the excep106
tional risk for a bankruptcy filing for families with children.

102. E-mail from Judge Elizabeth Perris, U.S. Bankr. Court Dist. of Or., to
Katherine Porter, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal. Irvine Sch. of Law (Jan. 13,
2011, 13:41 PST) (on file with author) (stating that the “kind[ ] of data collected . . . is limited by judicial policy to what is needed for case administration
and what is required by law” and that collecting racial identification would
require a change to judiciary policy).
103. Josh Zumbrun, Coming Soon: Millennials Married with Children,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/coming-soon
-millennials-married-with-children-1439371801.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2012).
105. See Signe-Mary McKernan & Caroline Ratcliffe, Events That Trigger
Poverty Entries and Exits, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 1146, 1146 (2005) (examining “how
[trigger] events—such as changes in household composition, employment status, disability status, and economic conditions—affect poverty entries and exits”); see also Mary Jo Bane & David T. Ellwood, Slipping into and out of Poverty: The Dynamics of Spells, 21 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 2 (1986) (referring to
these shocks as “disturbances”); Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety
Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 528 n.52 (2013) (recording as a shock event “any
event that [survey] respondents described as initially unanticipated and potentially damaging to [their] economic well-being”).
106. Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1006
(2002) (“By every measure, these data show that families with children are
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As she noted, “Children do not file for bankruptcy, but the story
107
of bankruptcy is a story about children.” Our finding supports
that her conclusion applies to how families fare in bankruptcy,
not just to risk of bankruptcy filing.
Debtors with children may start out able to make their
monthly plan payment, but with each additional child, there is
an increased risk of an unexpected event that wipes out the
money needed to make plan payments. For example, if a child
experiences an unexpected medical problem, the debtor would
have to pay for any expenses not covered by insurance, copayments, medical equipment and so on. Additionally, depending
on how severe the medical condition is, the debtor may have to
take off from work and lose income for those days, or even
worse, lose his or her job if there are too many absences (or late
arrivals) due to the medical condition. As this example illustrates, shocks of one type can spiral into a cascade of other
108
shocks, each resulting in a loss of income (or an expenditure).
For debtors paying into chapter 13 plans, a cushion to account
for this type of expense is usually unavailable, since any disposable (after court-approved expenses) income is going to109
wards plan payments. As previous research has shown, families who experience financial shocks often rely on credit cards
110
to stay afloat during the fall-out from shocks. For chapter 13
debtors, credit cards are likely to be unavailable or only offer a

disproportionately at risk for bankruptcy when compared with their childless
counterparts.”).
107. Id. at 1004.
108. For further details about how one shock can result in a cascade of other negative and expensive events, see id.
109. Some districts do permit a cushion in debtors’ budgets, while others do
not. This is a frequently proffered example of local legal culture. While chapter
13 provides that “all” of a debtor’s disposable income is to be paid to creditors,
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012), some courts accept a cushion or reserve fund
for emergencies as a legitimate “reasonably necessary” expense that may be
deducted from disposable income. See, e.g., In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553, 563
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (“[A] reasonable reserve or contingency fund in the
debtor’s budget would not violate 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) and is properly a
part of the disposable income analysis.”); In re Fries, 68 B.R. 676, 683 n.7
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (permitting a contingency fund of $92.16 per month for
a family of four with two young children). But see In re LaSota, 351 B.R. 56, 60
(Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2006) (denying savings to build a bank account for the future, observing that while “[p]ursuit of a growing bank account is certainly
more highly recommended than pursuit of a finer house or car, . . . it is still
‘discretionary’”). We discuss the idea of how chapter 13 might accommodate
income and expense instability further in Part IV, infra.
110. Greene, supra note 105, at 552–57.
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111

couple hundred dollars of credit. This leaves people in bankruptcy without a resource available to nonbankrupt families to
cope with the unexpected expenses that children often create.
These findings add to the longstanding research of Elizabeth Warren and others that describes the typical bankruptcy
debtor as a white, middle-aged, person, with some college and
112
other indicia of middle class membership. Our regression
analysis shows that two demographic characteristics—being
black and having minor dependents—significantly change the
odds a chapter 13 bankruptcy filing will be successful. The law
may be race-neutral and believe that it makes appropriate allowances for dependents; however, our findings suggest that
changes may be needed to level the playing field across demographic groups.
C. SYSTEM PROCESS MODEL
In a prior study of chapter 13 completions, Jean Braucher
113
compared plan completion rates in different judicial districts.
She used regression analysis to examine whether variations on
district practice could be supplementing the attitudinal differences of debtors’ attorneys, judges, and trustees that she identi114
fied in a seminal piece on local legal culture. Her thesis was
that procedural or operational differences were a key mechanism for expressing local legal culture, and themselves rein-

111. People in chapter 13 bankruptcy can use credit cards, but there are
several reasons why this is uncommon. First, as a consequence of the filing,
the issuer will normally cancel any credit card listed as a debt in the bankruptcy. Second, chapter 13 debtors must obtain the permission of the chapter
13 trustee to take on any new debt during their repayment plans. This permission adds a major procedural step for debtors, and trustees vary in their
willingness to grant such requests. Third, cards that are available are likely to
be either secured cards (in which the borrower puts cash on deposit with the
lender as collateral for repayment) or to be capped at very low amounts. Additionally, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of
2009 sharply limited default fees and imposed other requirements to discourage issuers from giving cards to people who are likely to have problems making payment. Because chapter 13 debtors are supposed to be devoting all excess income to repayment, they are not able to demonstrate their ability to
repay additional new debts.
112. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS,
supra note 3.
113. Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 557,
558 (2001).
114. Id. at 577–79.
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force the belief culture of a particular district. These systems
decisions—often driven by a particular judge’s or trustee’s preferences, or historical practices—are viewed as inevitable, nonmalleable qualities of chapter 13. “Everyone” in the bankruptcy
world knows that if you file in District X that certain processes
116
will be used.
Consider three illustrative examples. The Central District
of California has a rate of pro se filings that is many multiples
117
of the national average. This has endured for decades, despite
118
lamentations. Filers without an attorney face severe hard119
ships in navigating chapter 13 bankruptcy. This varies by
district, which we address in the regression with a random effects control, but even within a district, the judges and trustees
have more or less tolerance for filers without an attorney. Some
are quick to dismiss these cases, believing they are essentially
doomed to failure; others have extensive programs to assist
these filers. The self-help desk, the online chat, and electronic
self-representation software are examples of innovations in the
Central District of California to ease the burdens on people
120
without attorneys. There is no similar program in other areas
in the judicial district.
As another example, there are judges who vehemently oppose wage orders, which are a voluntary deduction of the plan
payment from the employer, on the grounds that they brush too
121
close to the Thirteenth Amendment or are paternalistic. Oth115. Id. at 559.
116. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Superdelegation and Gatekeeping in Bankruptcy Courts, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 875, 891–92 (2015) (describing judges’ practices,
including standing orders and informal, yet known, requirements that create
variation in chapter 13 hearings).
117. US BANKR. COURT CENT. DIST. OF CAL., ACCESS TO JUSTICE: SELFREPRESENTED PARTIES AND THE COURT 2013 (2013), http://www.cacb.uscourts
.gov/sites/cacb/files/documents/publications/ProSe%20Annual%20Report%
202013.pdf [hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE].
118. Id.
119. Littwin, supra note 50, at 158.
120. ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 117, at 19–22.
121. See Randolph, supra note 16 (“Some experts disagree that automatic
payments should be mandatory. In the late 1930s, when Congress debated the
wage-earned plans precursor to chapter 13 bankruptcy, one bankruptcy official in the Northern District of Illinois objected to the court’s exercise of control over debtors’ income. Today, at least one judicial district prohibits mandatory wage orders. Others doubt that mandatory automatic payments teach
debtors to pay their bills on time because it facilitates their reliance on someone else (the trustee) to submit payments for them.”); see also In re Aberegg,
1990 WL 92429 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. June 15, 1990) (denying trustee’s request
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er trustees or judges impose them nearly automatically; a debtor must actually inquire or object to learn that a wage order is
not actually required by the Bankruptcy Code. A leading chapter 13 treatise advises that “Debtors’ attorneys can enhance the
likelihood of success of their clients’ cases and, incidentally, enhance the likelihood of payment of attorneys’ fees by insisting
upon income deduction orders at the filing of every Chapter 13
122
case.”
Finally, several trustees believe that making mortgage
payments through the plan (called “conduit pay” because the
trustee serves as an intermediary to transmit the homeowner’s
mortgage payment to the mortgage servicer) is beneficial to
plan completion. Despite educational efforts, many trustees re123
fuse to shoulder this burden. Some cite the need to change
procedures and educate local practitioners, while others note
that it can, in some cases, increase costs of plan administration
124
at least initially.
The system process model looks at how cases are administered to see if these approaches are related to plan completion.
We hypothesized that factors that reduce debtor discretion and
increase expert involvement in the case would increase plan
completion. These variables are wage orders, paying the mortgage through the plan, and attorney representation. Conversely, we expected that those in longer plans or with more refilings
would be less likely to complete plans. The longer the plan, the
more opportunity for missed payments that result in case dismissal. Those with refilings have a prior history of plan failure
that chapter 13 debtors be forced to submit payment using a wage order because doing so would potentially bring chapter 123 into conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment); cf. In re Leask, 194 B.R. 416, 418 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996)
(rejecting argument that a wage deduction order in a chapter 13 case would
violate the prohibition in the Texas Constitution on wage garnishment).
122. Keith M. Lundin & William H. Brown, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, 4TH
EDITION, § 248.1, ¶ 8, Sec. Rev. June 8, 2004, www.Ch13online.net; see also
Randolph, supra note 16 (stating that data “indicate a strong correlation between automatic payment rules and plan completion rates”).
123. Doreen Solomon & Martha Hallowell, Chapter 13 Trustees Weigh Advantages and Disadvantages of Paying Debtors’ Ongoing Mortgages, NACTT
Q., Apr./May/June 2009, reprinted in Bankruptcy Articles, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/ust/bankruptcy-articles#2009 (download PDF) (“If a
trustee chooses not to handle ongoing mortgage payments, the U.S. Trustee
will support that decision. . . . We understand that managing these mortgages
will require more resources . . . .”).
124. Gordon Bermant & Jean Braucher, Making Post-Petition Mortgage
Payments Inside Chapter 13 Plans: Facts, Law, Policy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J.
261, 261–62 (2006).
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that we expected would repeat; this intuition is supported by
125
prior studies. Some trustees that we interviewed for this project, however, believed that there was a “learning curve” to
chapter 13 and stated that in their districts prior filers were
126
more likely to complete. We sought to test this hypothesis
with a large, national sample and regression techniques.
1. Predictor Variables
Most of the variables come from the 2007 CBP’s written
survey. Two of these variables—wage order and mortgage paid
through the plan—were not coded by the 2007 CBP, and we
went back to each of hundreds of case files to discern the relevant data. In some instances, the use of these procedures could
not be discerned.
a) Length of Plan: This ordinal variable represents length
in months of each filer’s chapter 13 plan. The variable is coded
as “0” for those with a plan of 36 months or less, “1” for those
with a plan more than 36 months but less than 60 months, and
“2” for those with a 60-month plan. In our sample, more than
half of the sample (approximately 62%) had 60-month plans.
b) Number of Prior Bankruptcies: For each filer, we coded
this variable as “0” for individuals with no prior bankruptcies,
“1” for individuals with one prior bankruptcy, or “2” for individuals with 2 or more bankruptcies. Approximately 69% of the
sample had no prior bankruptcies and 20% had one prior bankruptcy.
c) Attorney Represented: This is a dichotomous variable
that is coded “1” for filers with attorney representation. In the
sample 96% had attorney representation.
d) Mortgage Payment Plan: We, the authors of this Article,
added this variable to the 2007 CBP data for the purposes of
this study. We determined whether, for each debtor with ongoing mortgage payments, whether the debtor was making these
payments directly or the payments were “conduit,” paid by the
trustee out of the overall contribution of the debtor to repayment. This variable is a dichotomous variable coded as “1” for
125. Norberg, supra note 8, at 449.
126. E-mail from Debra Miller, Chapter 13 Trustee, N. Dist. of Ind., to
Katherine Porter, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal. Irvine Sch. of Law (Sept. 11,
2015, 11:28 PST) (on file with author) (“I think that a prior chapter 13 that
dismissed is generally a good indicator that the second filed chapter 13 bankruptcy will be more likely to complete and be successful. . . . Some trustees call
the first case a starter bankruptcy.”).
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filers that have their mortgages paid through a plan. In the
sample, 57% of cases had mortgages paid through the plan by
the trustee.
e) Wage Order: This is a binary variable representing
whether a wage order was entered in the case. In unconfirmed
cases, this was coded as a no. About one-third (34%) of cases
had a wage order used to collect the plan payment.
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for System Process Model
Min

Max

Median

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Length of Plan

0

2

2

1.39

0.84

Number of Prior
Bankruptcies

0

2

0

0.42

0.68

Attorney Representation

0

1

1

0.98

0.15

Mortgage Payment Plan

0

1

1

0.59

0.49

Wage Order

0

1

0

0.35

0.48

2. Regression Results
Compared to the other three models, the system process
model is smaller in two senses. The number of observations is
682 cases. The largest number of cases (eighty-nine) was
dropped because the length of the plan was not observed in the
records. The model also contains fewer independent variables—
only five. Nonetheless, as Table 7 reports, we find some surprising results. Many of the most “cultural” aspects of bankruptcy
practice—reflecting the choices and preferences of the local
chapter 13 trustee and the small cadre of judges—do not seem
to influence chapter 13 outcomes. The model estimation also affirms the prior research on repeat filers and pro se filers. Both
groups fare poorly relative to first-time bankruptcy debtors and
those who have attorney representation.
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Table 7: System Process Model
Predicted
Probabilities
(mean-sd)

Predicted
Probabilities
(mean+sd)

Difference in
Predicted
Probabilities

-0.12
(0.10)

0.40

0.35

-0.05

Number of
Prior Bankruptcies

-0.66***
(0.13)

0.44

0.27

-0.17

Attorney
Representation

2.27*
(1.05)

0.30

0.39

0.09

Mortgage
Payment
Plan

-0.08
(0.20)

0.38

0.36

0.02

0.29
(0.19)
-2.24

0.35

0.40

0.05

Coefficients

Length of
Plan

Wage Order
Constant
Log
Likelihood

-445.42

Notes: 1) Predicted probabilities represent the predicted probability of discharge for each variable plus and minus the standard deviation holding all other variables in the model constant at their mean.
2) *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
3) Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

3. Interpretation of Findings
Local legal culture is the theory that even when the formal
law is the same or similar across locations, perceptions, expec127
tations, and beliefs can change the reality of law. The postulation was that local legal culture transcends individual experiences, endures over a long period of time, and is a shared set of
128
beliefs in the anthropological sense of the term “culture.” In

127. Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, supra note 10, at 804 (defining local
legal culture as “systematic and persistent variations in local legal practices as
a consequence of a complex of perceptions and expectations shared by many
practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and differing in identifiable
ways from the practices, perceptions, and expectations existing in other localities subject to the same or a similar formal legal regime.”).
128. Id. at 803.
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their seminal piece, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook argued
that “local legal culture exercises a pervasive, systematic influence on the operation of the federal bankruptcy system,” and
pointed to variations in chapter 13 as an example of such ef129
fects. They argued that in bankruptcy, context, as much as
the Bankruptcy Code, created legal experiences, and they proffered quantitative and qualitative data to support the role of
130
local legal culture.
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook argued that future research should be sensitive to local legal culture, and that anal131
ysis of the bare law was insufficient. They warned that even
empirical studies of the bankruptcy system might “miss the
underlying reality” or be “incomplete” if the studies did not or
132
could not include indicators of local effects. Their powerful
conclusion called for an end to the “anonymity of local legal cultures” and a new approach to assessing law:
Local legal culture is not just dust in the national legal machine. In
fact, it may be a significant element of the legal landscape. Failure to
account for it causes policy debates as well as legal reforms to fall
wide of their marks. It is surely time to accelerate our study of such
cultures and to begin to piece together a systematic view of their in133
fluence on the legal system.

Simultaneously to Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, others were articulating similar concerns. Jean Braucher interviewed dozens of attorneys, finding significantly different approaches in counseling debtors on the appropriateness of
134
chapter 13. Gary Neustadter observed lawyers’ intake and
counseling sessions and found significant differences in the
structure and content of their questions and their answers to
135
clients. Decades later, Melissa Jacoby reports on an extreme
variation of delegation techniques used by judges with respect
136
to chapter 13 plan confirmation. Local legal culture took its
129. Id. at 806.
130. Id. at 853 (“The narratives suggest and the data support the conclusion that the differences may coalesce into a force that has a measurable impact on debtor decisionmaking.”).
131. Id. at 861.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 865.
134. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many
Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 502–03 (1993).
135. Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office,
35 BUFF. L. REV. 177, 178 (1986).
136. See Jacoby, supra note 116, at 876–77 (contrasting judges who hand
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place alongside the statutes in the Bankruptcy Code, the Colliers’ treatise, and published case law as a guidepost for what
bankruptcy really “is.”
Even as empirical studies have become larger and increasingly sophisticated, local legal culture persists as the response
to findings that are counter to one’s beliefs, experiences, or perceptions. The exemplar of the explanatory interaction between
data and local legal culture is the debate about discharge rates
in chapter 13. As one of us has written, “[t]he hard fact is that
every single study of the consumer bankruptcy system has con137
cluded that repayment bankruptcies fail” to end in discharge.
The response points to the widespread variation in districts as
138
evidence that chapter 13 can work. One need only look under
139
the correct rock to find the answer. Actors in the bankruptcy
system report that “their district,” “their cases,” or “their court”
are different than the data in a study of chapter 13 outcomes,
inviting the researcher to study the differences (i.e., the better
140
way of doing things) used in their local area.
In chapter 13, local legal culture has become the residual
141
explanation for the extreme variation in practice. When the
efficacy of a local process is questioned, the default justification
is that one could not change it—even with a better approach—
because local legal culture is so enduring and powerful. This
point was raised repeatedly in the recent rulemaking effort to
create a national form for a chapter 13 plan. Actors from various districts asserted that “their” system was not broken, and
142
so the use of a national form should not be mandated. Under
pressure from those with a national perspective who found the
variation in plans to be problematic, some critics compromised,
over their courtrooms to chapter 13 trustees to conduct plan confirmation
hearings with judges who impose additional hurdles on chapter 13 beyond the
statutory confirmation requirements).
137. Porter, supra note 5, at 155.
138. Id. at 117; Whitford, supra note 15, at 12–13.
139. Whitford, supra note 15, at 13 (acknowledging the “extreme variance
in Chapter 13 practice . . . which came to be called ‘local legal culture’”).
140. Porter, supra note 5, at 153.
141. See Whitford, supra note 15, at 13 (“Chapter 13 practices can vary
considerably even within a single judicial district.”).
142. Meeting Minutes of Advisory Committee on Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Apr. 20, 2015, http://www
.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee
-rules-bankruptcy-procedure-may-2015. In the wake of disagreement, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure decided to delay implementing a model form for a plan. Its future remains uncertain.
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allowing that those districts that wanted to adopt the model
143
plan should be permitted to do so. The defeat of a national
model chapter 13 plan is consistent with an embrace of local legal culture.
Many of the administrative variables in this model are exactly the administrative practice differences that judges, trustees, and attorneys turn to when they claim that their district
is different—they are doing things right, unlike the rest of the
144
country. These factors, indeed, are where local legal culture is
most salient. Judges and trustees may perceive that these ad145
ministrative choices are beneficial, but hard data do not support that they boost chapter 13 completion. Our model shows
that these administrative variations do not correlate with suc146
cess for debtors, contradicting conventional wisdom. This is
not to suggest that such goals are not valid. Trustees and judges may prefer wage orders, for example, because they minimize
late payments. Also, mortgage payments through the plan may
assist debtors in ensuring that servicer records are reconciled
at the end of the case with their payments during the plan. Our
empirical findings, however, illustrate the need for robust evaluation of the efficacy of legal systems. People embedded in the
system have many goals and factors that influence their beliefs.
Our data collection and analysis serve as beneficial tools for
challenging assumptions and distinguishing in policy debates
between sound general approaches, and the specific practices
that demonstrably increase plan completion.
Additionally, the anecdotal belief among some bankruptcy
professionals that a prior history of plan failure actually increases success in the subsequent chapter bankruptcy is simi147
larly not supported by the data. Instead, the inverse is true—
143. Marvin Isgur et al., Comments on Proposed National Chapter 13 Plan:
A Diverse Group of Bankruptcy Professionals Propose a Compromise Solution,
REGULATIONS.GOV (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=
USC-RULES-BK-2014-0001-0061 (download “Committee Submission Letter”)
(proposing to allow districts to decide whether to adopt the national model
form or create a local version of a model form).
144. See Randolph, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
145. A. THOMAS SMALL & EUGENE R. WEDOFF, A PROPOSAL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE BANKRUPTCY REFORM 16 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
American Bankruptcy Institute) (arguing that wage orders and mortgage
payments through the plan are the most effective way to help debtors complete repayment, relying in part on their years of experience as bankruptcy
judges).
146. Bermant & Braucher, supra note 124, at 277.
147. E-mail from Debra Miller, supra note 126 (“That prior case makes the

1074

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1031

with no prior bankruptcies, the likelihood of a discharge is 0.44.
With one prior bankruptcy, this drops to 0.29, and with more
than two prior bankruptcies, the likelihood of discharge is 0.17.
This is consistent with research showing that the primary reason most chapter 13 refilers had dropped out of bankruptcy the
first time was because they experienced a financial shock that
148
People may file a later
made payment plans impossible.
bankruptcy case because they had somewhat recovered from
the prior shock and wanted to try again to get bankruptcy relief
149
as a lasting solution to piled up debts. Our data suggest,
however, that these people are high-risk cases. We cannot
measure their attitudes, and perhaps the trustees are correct
150
that these debtors are “more realistic.” The data show they
still face exceptionally long odds compared to first-time filers—
who themselves have less than even odds of plan completion.
One might postulate two interpretations of this connection
between refilers, shocks, and plan failure. First, those who
were most vulnerable to experiencing a shock during the first
filing might be at higher risk for experiencing a shock during
the second filing. Perhaps they have less financial stability in
their lives overall compared to non-refilers. Or, it may be that
this group of refilers is at no higher risk of a shock than firsttime filers, but since they did not have the resources to withstand the shock and continue making their chapter 13 payments the first time, they similarly are unable to do so when a
shock hits again. They did not have a financial cushion the first
time around, and they similarly did not have it for previous filings. There is not enough research about financial shocks and
stability at this time to know which, if either, of these theories
is correct, but they may help explain why refilers are at an increased risk for plan failure.
An area where scholars and professionals have long had
151
common ground is concern about pro se filings. Those who
debtors more likely to be successful in the second bankruptcy—they know
what is expected and are willing to make changes to their lifestyles to make it
happen. Because of that realistic attitude and commitment to changes, debtors
filing their second bankruptcies are generally more likely to complete their
chapter 13.”).
148. Sara Sternberg Greene, The Failed Reform: Congressional Crackdown
on Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Refilers, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 241, 262–63
(2015).
149. Id.
150. E-mail from Debra Miller, supra note 126.
151. See NAT’L. BANKR. REV. COMM’N., supra note 121, at 235 (“[D]ebtors
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have attorneys are much more likely to finish chapter 13. The
predicted probability of getting a discharge is much greater
with an attorney. Prior research pointed to this problem. For
example, Angela Littwin, using an earlier version of the 2007
CBP (before plan completion data was available) that we use in
this Article, reported that pro se chapter 13 filers get their cas152
es dismissed quickly. Without an attorney to help them craft
a plan that satisfies creditors and the trustee, such debtors face
objections to plan confirmation and hearings before the court
that they are ill equipped to navigate alone. While this finding
is not surprising to us, the analysis is helpful to undergird arguments that access to justice issues relate to actual justice
achieved by consumers. As in nonbankruptcy legal settings, an
effective reform needs to take into account the process-oriented
factors that relate to plan completion, not just the substantive
153
legal rules. Our analysis can help policymakers weigh the
relative costs and benefits of interventions such as pro se clerks
for bankruptcy courts or requiring attorney representation for
chapter 13 filings. Our multi-factor model should advance the
debate from naked lamentations about the difficulties presented by pro se bankruptcy debtors. Both the refiling variable and
the attorney variable suggest that chapter 13 may benefit from
reforms that reduce its complexity and improve debtors’ abili154
ties to navigate the system to debt relief.
Of our models, the systems model best typifies the influence of local legal culture on the actual experience of chapter 13
practice. This model should be the most fruitful. The results
debunk the myth that a trustee’s or judge’s practices are hugely
who end up in the complicated Chapter 13 system without good advice are unlikely to be able to navigate their way through the process.”); Angela K.
Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest
Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1933, 1955–56 (2011); see also Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings
Growing Faster than Other Debtor Relief, AM. B. ASS’N (Dec. 29, 2011), https://
apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/010312-pro-se
-bankruptcy-growing.html; CONSUMER BANKR. PROJECT, CITY BAR JUSTICE
CTR., http://www.citybarjusticecenter.org/projects/consumer-bankruptcy
-project (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
152. Littwin, supra note 50, at 166 (reporting that in the 2007 Consumer
Bankruptcy Project sample, 91.3% of chapter 13 pro se cases were dismissed
before confirmation).
153. See generally D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal
Assistance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 951–55 (2013) (discussing the need for further research to determine best practices).
154. Porter, supra note 5, at 156 (“A simpler, redesigned system can articulate a crisp objective and build ways to test progress into the system itself.”).
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influential in how debtors fare. Choices such as wage orders
and paying through the plan may make the system more efficient or less expensive or have other beneficial features, but we
could not see that debtors succeed because of these practices.
Our finding pushes back at Jean Braucher’s seminal study that
asserted wage orders were a significant predictor of chapter 13
155
completion. Because we use case-level data and random effects on judicial district, we believe that our analysis provides a
more reliable and nuanced assessment of whether wage orders
and conduit pay are the keys to chapter 13 success. Sadly for
those looking for a quick fix for chapter 13—and one that does
not require Congressional amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code—procedural interventions will not remedy the concerns
about case outcomes.
We also note that the length of the repayment plan is not
statistically significant. In many ways, this is a happy finding.
On the one hand, unsecured creditors can rejoice that you can
squeeze longer and therefore increase recoveries, without forcing debtors out of repayment. On the other hand, from the
debtor-focused perspective, policymakers and scholars raised
grave concerns that the mandate of bankruptcy reforms
156
(BAPCPA) that certain families have five-year plans would
157
drive down chapter 13 success. This does not necessarily
mean that longer plans are sound policy. We cannot measure
the discouragement effect of five-year plans as our sample contains only those who did file bankruptcy.
More importantly for our question of interest, the immateriality of length of plan points toward the very problem with
any plan that is at least three years of length. To have an influence on success, any reform would need to amend the Bankruptcy Code to reduce the minimum repayment to fewer than
three years. Put another way, because all plans must be be158
tween three and five years, we can only show that this difference in repayment does not seem to influence outcomes. We

155. Braucher, supra note 113, at 578–79.
156. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2012) (imposing an “applicable commitment period” for repayment plans in chapter 13 of five years if income exceeds
the state median for a household of the same size as the debtor household).
157. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 25 (2001).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(A). The exceptions are if the debtor pays 100%
of unsecured debts prior to three years of plan repayment, id. § 1325(c), or if
the debtor obtains a hardship discharge under id. § 1328(b).
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cannot opine on the effect on chapter 13 plans if repayment
were of other lengths, such as one year or ten years.
D. HOUSEHOLD SECURITY MODEL
Prior CBP studies have provided substantial insights on
159
debtors’ self-identified reasons for filing bankruptcy. These
reasons are only obtainable from survey data, as bankruptcy
law itself does not require the debtor to provide an explanation
for the borrowing or repayment difficulties. The data on bankruptcy reasons point to factors associated with household economic security (such as job status and whether the debtor had
health insurance) as frequent contributors to the financial distress that leads to bankruptcy. Each iteration of CBP data over
the years found that shocks—from a job problem, a medical
problem, or a change in family situation—were the leading
160
causes of bankruptcy.
In this model, we examine whether the most common problems that precipitated bankruptcy in the first place continue to
affect debtors’ abilities to successfully complete their chapter 13
plans. The theory for why such a shock may continue to predict
ability to successfully complete chapter 13 is best illustrated
using an example. Consider a debtor who self-identifies that a
medical problem is his reason for filing for bankruptcy, and
that problem was cancer. One could imagine that the existence
of the medical problem, in this case cancer, makes the debtor
more susceptible to secondary shocks related to the cancer.
This could take the form of a recurrence, which would cause
further medical bills, more medical appointments—which result in loss of income—or a host of other factors. Or, the theory
could be that for any given shock, once someone experiences
such a shock and files for bankruptcy because of it, they are
more likely both to experience a shock, and to be unable to
weather the shock in the context of their financial reality
(which would include payment plans once they file for chapter
13 bankruptcy). Should this theory hold true, then attorneys
would know to ask potential debtors about the reasons they

159. See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT
(2000) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS].
160. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME
TRAP 81 (2003).
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filed for bankruptcy and indeed could consider chapter choice
based on these factors.
Likewise, should other predictors of household stability
(such as employment status, health insurance status, etc.) predict success in chapter 13, attorneys and debtors could consider
these factors when evaluating chapter choice and make more
informed decisions about a debtor’s ability to succeed based on
his or her unique financial situation. Indeed, health insurance
status, difficulty in making house payments, and other stability
factors are apparent at the time of filing, so knowing their relationships to success in chapter 13 has the potential to profoundly inform chapter choice without additional effort on the part of
the debtor or the attorney.
1. Predictor Variables
This model includes variables that examine why households filed for bankruptcy, and other household characteristics
that may influence financial security. Most of these variables
reflect the debtor’s self-reported reasons for filing bankruptcy
or coping strategies used before bankruptcy. These variables
were not available in prior studies, which relied solely on ad161
ministrative (non-survey) data. There are 768 observations in
this model.
a) Job Reason: This dichotomous variable represents
whether bankruptcy was filed due to losing a job or decline in
income, as self-reported in the survey. Approximately fifty-six
percent of the sample filed due to loss of job or decline in income.
b) Medical Reason: This dichotomous variable represents
whether bankruptcy was filed due to medical reasons. Forty
four percent of the sample filed for medical reasons.
c) Family Reason: This dichotomous variable represents
whether bankruptcy was filed due to a change in family dynamics, such as divorce, death in family, or birth of a child. Thirtyone percent filed for bankruptcy due to a change in family dynamics.
d) House Reason: This dichotomous variable represents
whether bankruptcy was filed because filers couldn’t afford
their house or mortgage. Fifty-six percent of the sample filed
for this reason.

161. See supra note 8.
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e) Spending Reason: A dichotomous variable that
measures whether bankruptcy was filed due to problems controlling spending. Twenty-six percent of the sample filed for
this reason.
f) Help Others Reason: A dichotomous variable that
measures whether a reason for the debtors’ financial problems
that preceded bankruptcy was helping others financially. Nineteen percent of the sample filed for this reason.
g) Health Insurance: This variable measures the health
insurance status of everyone in the household. Zero is coded for
households where no one has health insurance. One is coded for
households where only some have health insurance and two is
coded for households where everyone is insured.
h) Family/Friends Borrow: This dichotomous variable
measures whether filers borrowed money from family or friends
two years before filing bankruptcy. Sixty-six percent of the
sample borrowed money two years prior to filing.
i) Working Household: This dichotomous variable
measures whether individuals in the household are working.
Approximately seventy-eight percent of the sample has one
person in the household who is working.
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Household Security
Model
Min

Max

Median

Mean

Standard
Deviation

0

1

1

0.56

0.50

Job Reason
Medical Reason

0

1

0

0.44

0.50

Family Reason

0

1

0

0.31

0.46

House Reason

0

1

1

0.56

0.50

Spending Reason

0

1

0

0.26

0.44

Help Others Reason

0

1

0

0.19

0.39

Health Insurance

0

2

2

1.58

0.70

Family/Friends Borrow

0

1

1

0.66

0.47

Working Household

0

1

1

0.78

0.42

2

Regression Results

There were 768 observations in this model. As in the first
three models, a case observation was dropped from the sample
for analysis when one variable or more was missing. Table 9
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presents the results from the logistic regression. Also consistent with the first three models, random effects were used to
control for the effect of judicial district and the dependent variable was the case ending in a chapter 13 discharge as the positive outcome (“1”).
When we compare the differences in the predicted probabilities to determine the influence each variable has on chapter 13
completion, we see that the variable with the largest difference
has the most influence on chapter 13 completion. Therefore, out
of all the variables included in the household security model,
we find that house affordability (House Reason) has the largest
effect in predicting chapter 13 completion (difference = 0.23),
followed by whether someone in the household was working
(Working Household) (difference = 0.15), and finally the health
insurance status (Health Insurance) of everyone in the household (difference = 0.13).
Table 9: Household Security Model
Predicted
Probabilities
(mean-sd)

Predicted
Probabilities
(mean+sd)

Difference in
Predicted
Probabilities

0.12
(0.17)

0.34

0.37

0.03

Medical
Reason

-0.16
(0.17)

0.37

0.34

-0.03

Family
Reason

-0.24
(0.18)

0.37

0.32

0.05

House
Reason

-0.97***
(0.17)

0.47

0.26

-0.21

Spending
Reason

0.28
(0.19)

0.34

0.38

0.04

Help Others
Reason

-0.11
(0.22)

0.36

0.34

-0.02

Health
Insurance

0.39**
(0.13)

0.29

0.42

0.13

Coefficients
Job Reason
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-0.31+
(0.18)

0.39

0.33

-0.06

0.71**
(0.22)

0.29

0.39

0.10

-1.01
-462.72

Notes: 1) Predicted probabilities represents the predicted probability of discharge for each variable plus and minus the standard deviation holding all other variables in the model constant at their mean.
2) +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
3) Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
4) We also tried this same model but used job tenure (continuous variable of years employed) instead of a working household dichotomous
variable. There was no difference in statistical significance of any variable from the model presented in Table 9. Job tenure was statistically
significant in the estimation, with a positive sign, indicating that
those households with longer job tenure were more likely to complete
chapter 13 discharge (p<0.01). We included working household in the
model instead of job tenure because of the need to drop observations
when a debtor gave years for a status such as “unemployed,” “student,” or “retired.” Years in these non-working situations does not
measure the possible effect on household income stability in the same
way as years of continued employment at a particular job.

3. Interpretation of Findings
At first glance, the results of this model may appear surprising because the factors that most contribute to entrance into bankruptcy (financial shock events such as job loss, a medical issue, or a change in family status), do not predict success in
162
chapter 13. As discussed in the introduction to this model, it
is easy to postulate that a household that experiences a shock
before filing for bankruptcy would be less likely to succeed in
chapter 13. Warren, Westbrook, and Sullivan were crusaders
for empirical research to identify the factors most likely to
162. NAT’L. BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 121, at 234 (“Some commentators suggest that debtors frequently encounter repeated financial difficulties. . . . The same kinds of spotty employment or medical problems that
caused debtors’ initial financial problems may reemerge, or new problems may
appear.”).
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163

cause bankruptcy, and indeed, much of the academic investigation into consumer bankruptcy focuses on the front-end: who
files and why?
The important takeaway from this model is that the data
show that the “why” of bankruptcy filing is not determinative of
success in bankruptcy. Put another way, the household security
model suggests that at least some of the most important factors
in causing financial failure do not doom people to failing to address their financial problems.
Two examples illustrate the twists in the relationship between pre-bankruptcy problems and “in-bankruptcy” problems.
For decades, the CBP data have shown that a job problem is
164
the number one, self-identified cause of bankruptcy. When
reduction or elimination of income leaves people unable to meet
expenses and drives up debt, the result is bankruptcy. Chapter
13, however, requires people to have steady income as an initial
165
eligibility criterion. Those with the most severe job problems,
such as long-term unemployment, thus are likely diverted to
chapter 7 as a matter of law. Attorneys also may counsel families with substantial income volatility, such as independent
166
contractors or seasonal workers, to file chapter 7. Job problems that created debt are likely at least partially resolved by
the time people file chapter 13 bankruptcy. This factor is not
significant in our model. As a second, more abbreviated example, consider family change or break-up. This variable, both in
our data and in studies on reasons for bankruptcy, includes situations such as death of a spouse, divorce or separation, or the
163. See generally SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS, supra note 159; SULLIVAN, WARREN, & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE
OUR DEBTORS, supra note 3.
164. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra
note 159, at 79, fig.3.1 (showing that 67.5% of bankruptcy debtors reported one
or more job problems); see also id. at 105 (“[B]y every measure, the debtors in
bankruptcy are there as a result of trouble at work.”).
165. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012) (“Only an individual with regular income . . .
may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.”).
166. Some courts have interpreted “regular income,” id. § 109(e), quite
broadly to include sources such as regular monthly support from a boyfriend,
and most courts accept benefits payments as “regular income” if they have no
termination date (such as long-term disability). Unemployment or severance,
because of its temporary nature, may not satisfy the legal requirement for
“regular income.” See, e.g., In re Loomis, 487 B.R. 296, 300 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
2013) (holding that a debtor who was no longer eligible to receive unemployment compensation, and whose girlfriend of eighteen months did not give him
funds to pay his separate bills, was “not ‘an individual with regular income’”
as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)).
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birth of a child. While these events destabilize household income and expenses, they are (relatively) discrete moments. After a period of months or years, the household may have sharply reduced income, with spousal/child support not making up
the cost of a separate household, for example, but the amount
of income will be fairly fixed. People in financial distress because of a family change can follow the advice to wait until
their financial situation has stopped declining before seeking
167
bankruptcy help. With relatively stable income, these families can assess whether they can make the years of payments in
chapter 13.
When the regression results are analyzed in the context of
household security research, the data are consistent with that
literature. Factors that curb a household’s ability to reallocate
income or adjust expenses make it harder to complete chapter
13. We suspect that bankruptcy debtors deploy a variety of
strategies to find the cash to pay the trustee, similar to other
168
households where money is tight. Similarly, a lack of incomeor expense-smoothing tools, such as insurance, leaves a household more vulnerable to financial turbulence. The result is to
destabilize the chapter 13 plan. “Bankruptcy does not insulate
169
against subsequent disaster,” and families with less flexibility in budgets fall out of chapter 13 to cope.
The biggest indicator of predicting chapter 13 success in
this model is housing cost. Based on our data, a household that
filed for bankruptcy because it could not afford its rent or mortgage payment has only a 26% likelihood of completing chapter
13 successfully. The problem is not the absolute size of the
housing payment; it is the amount of income that each month
must be committed without exception to avoid risking eviction
or foreclosure. Housing costs cannot be easily adjusted. One
must locate new housing and actually move. The associated
costs, such as rental deposits and moving expenses, require
available cash that few families with debt problems have. Families literally bunker down in their existing housing—even
when the house is, as Elizabeth Warren colorfully described, a

167. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, ALL YOUR WORTH:
THE ULTIMATE LIFETIME MONEY PLAN 266 (2005) (“Bankruptcy helps the
most if you wait until the crisis has passed before you file.”).
168. Laura M. Tach & Sara Sternberg Greene, Robbing Peter To Pay Paul:
Economic and Cultural Explanations for How Lower-Income Families Manage
Debt, 61 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 1, 10–16 (2014).
169. NAT’L. BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 121, at 234.
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170

“cement life raft.” If housing costs are a fixed component that
chews up more than 30% (or 50%) of a family’s income, the
budget has limited flexibility. Faced with the choice between
losing a place to live and paying the trustee, many families
make their mortgage payments and short their creditors. However, these same families are unlikely to have been persuaded
to file chapter 7, because a primary reason for filing for bankruptcy may have been to try to save their home from foreclosure.
The second most influential factor in our household security model was membership in the active labor force. The majority, or 78% of the sample, had at least one person working in the
household. The remainder of the sample cases had income generated by retirement, benefits, or other usually fixed amounts.
Working households were more likely to successfully complete
chapter 13 than households without at least one adult in the
labor market. Income from a job, of course, provides the means
to make plan payments, but as illustrated in the Debtor Finances Model (Table 3) that examined financial characteristics,
the amount of income itself does not appear to relate to chapter
13 completion. The primary obstacle for nonworking households may be the inability of an adult to boost income as expenses increase or to cope with temporary expenses. To make
ends meet, lower-wage workers may add hours or shifts, take
on seasonal employment, or look for a better paying position.
Non-workers, such as people with a permanent disability or infirm from age, cannot boost their incomes. In fact, unless cost of
living adjustments are adequate, their buying power may decline in subsequent years, even as plan payments remain level.
It would be an uphill battle to complete chapter 13 on a fixed
income, especially those that are designed to be subsistence
amounts such as public benefit programs.
The next strongest influence on chapter 13 completion is
health insurance. Households that have no health insurance
(for any members of the household) are 29% less likely to successfully complete chapter 13 than their insured counterparts.
Insurance does not necessarily, on average, reduce health costs
171
when premiums and out-of-pocket costs are considered. But
170. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 160, at 137.
171. We confess that we have not examined the health finance literature to
know the empirical answer for typical Americans. Our point is that the entire
theory of insurance is built on the idea that the premiums, over time in the
aggregate, are more than the actual costs.
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inexorably, insurance smooths costs. Instead of no bills when
all are healthy and nonabsorbent expenses when someone is ill,
insurance allows families to stabilize their household budgets
by paying a fixed premium and (relatively) modest copays. Insurance protects against expense shock, which can jolt a family
out of chapter 13.
Ultimately, the household security model shows us that
there are some important factors associated with household security that help predict success in chapter 13, but some of the
most important factors that affected household security before
filing do not ultimate predict stability and success once a debtor
files for chapter 13.
III. PREDICTORS OF CHAPTER 13 SUCCESS
The four models described above identify certain factors
that are predictive of chapter 13 success. Each is built on a different theory of bankruptcy, hypothesizing respectively that
what matters is debtor’s financial situations, their demographics, the implementation of chapter 13 in their case,
and their financial prospects/habits. In this Section, we estimate a final model that brings together all statistically significant factors in the prior separate models. These are the independent variables, with chapter 13 discharge remaining as the
dependent variable. The final model allows us to identify which
independent variables retain their statistical significance when
controlling for other variables that have measurable effect.
Table 10 below shows the results from the final model. The
negative findings are easiest to see. Only two variables no longer retain statistical significance at the 5% level: secured debt
and borrowed money from family/friends to cope before bankruptcy. As Table 10 indicates, secured debt is significant at the
10% level, and we are reluctant given the novelty of our study
172
to discard it as worthy of further study.
The right-hand column of Table 10 allows for a rank ordering of the variables having the most influence on chapter 13
success. The bigger the difference in the two calculated predicted probabilities, the larger the effect of that variable. Although
172. We are particularly cautious given that the cases in our sample were
filed in 2007, when mortgage debt as a form of household leverage was at an
all-time high. Although we think this cuts the other way, and makes it even
more likely that secured debt is not a major predictor of chapter 13 completion, we also know that statistical significance is a test on a particular sample,
and that “close can count.”
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we have discussed the implications of each variable in the context of its model, we reflect here on the relative magnitude of
the significant factors on chapter 13 success.
Discouragingly, but perhaps not surprisingly in light of
continued evidence of racial issues in the United States, having
one or more self-identified black people in a debtor household is
a powerful predictor of bankruptcy failure (difference in predicted probabilities, 0.17). Holding equal other factors in the final model, a black debtor is 17% less likely to receive a dis173
charge in chapter 13 than a non-black person. More than
amount of debt, prior bankruptcies, trying to save a home from
foreclosure, or having a job—all features that are imbedded in
chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code—race matters.
The next largest differences in the predicted probabilities
are unsecured debt amount (difference=0.19), house reason (dif174
ference=0.13) and working household (difference=0.10). Of
the three-dozen variables studied, we find that these are the
most predictive of chapter 13 success. A person who reports
that trying to save a house from foreclosure was a reason for
their seeking bankruptcy has a 29% chance of discharge. Making identical assumptions about the factors in the full model, a
person who filed bankruptcy for reasons other than saving a
house has a much higher likelihood of success at 42%. Entering
chapter 13 to save a house—precisely one of its vaunted benefits compared to the chapter 7 liquidation alternative—
predisposes a debtor to not completing the plan and getting
debt relief.

173. The 17% figure presents the difference in the predicted probability of a
chapter 13 discharge for a black debtor with all other variables in the model
held at the value of its mean minus its standard deviation and for a black
debtor with each other variable in the model held at the value of its means
plus its standard deviation.
174. For this analysis, the positive and negative signs on the “difference in
predicted probabilities” are not relevant. The absolute values of the differences
in predicted probabilities can be compared to each other to assess relative size.

2017]

CRACKING THE CODE

1087

Table 10: Full Model
Predicted
Probabilities
(mean-sd)

Predicted
Probabilities
(mean+sd)

Difference in
Predicted
Probabilities

0.11***
(0.002)

0.27

0.46

0.19

-0.03*
(0.01)

0.37

0.30

-0.07

-0.002+
(0.000)

0.39

0.31

-0.08

-0.41*
(0.17)

0.39

0.29

-0.10

-0.91***
(0.21)

0.43

0.26

-0.17

Number of
Minor
Dependents

-0.19*
(0.08)

0.40

0.30

-0.10

Number of
Prior Bankruptcies

-0.30*
(0.15)

0.38

0.31

-0.07

Attorney
Representation

2.20*
(1.07)

0.27

0.36

0.09

-0.59**
(0.20)

0.42

0.29

-0.13

-0.31*
(0.14)

0.31

0.40

0.09

Family/
Friends
Borrow

-0.27
(0.19)

0.38

0.33

-0.05

Working
Household

0.68**
(0.25)

0.28

0.38

0.10

Constant
Log
Likelihood

0.01

Coefficients
Unsecured
Debt

Priority Debt

Secured
Debt
Unaffordable
Housing

Black

House
Reason
Health
Insurance

-397.43
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Notes: 1) Predicted probabilities represent the predicted probability of discharge for each variable plus and minus the standard deviation holding all other variables in the model constant at their mean.
2) +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
3) Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Figure 1 below is a visualization of our key findings. It illustrates the difference in the probability of a debtor getting a
chapter 13 bankruptcy discharge, holding other factors in the
model at their central tendency point (mean (average) for continuous variables and median for categorical (dichotomous and
ordinal) variables). The figure shows that, for many variables,
there are marked changes in outcomes. For example, holding
all other factors at their midpoint, a debtor who has an attorney to help her navigate bankruptcy has a 36% chance of a discharge. Without help—going at it alone—we estimate a 6%
chance of debt relief for person of similar race, prior bankruptcies, secured debts, housing costs, insurance, or employment
status (all factors in model).
Figure 1:

As shown in Figure 1, the greater a household’s protection
from expense or income shocks, the higher the probability of
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discharge. Health insurance illustrates the effect; households
in which all people have insurance have the highest relative
rates of discharge (38% holding other variables at midpoint).
Next, are households with some, but not all members, insured
(31%). Households completely without insurance have the
grimmest odds (25%). We see similar trends in how housing affordability and working households relate to being able to meet
the demands of chapter 13 repayment plans.
The higher the amount of unsecured debt that a debtor
owes at bankruptcy filing, the greater likelihood that the debtor
completes the chapter 13 plan. This strikes us as a straightforward incentive effect. Debtors with large amounts of unsecured
debt need a discharge to forgive the amount of debts that they
cannot pay. If all plan payments are not made, there will not
175
typically be a discharge. Unless the debtor gets to the end of
the plan, making all required payments, the chapter 13 bankruptcy has only allowed them to whittle away at debts using
any disposable income—an outcome available without the additional costs and burdens of bankruptcy. To analogize, the discharge is the “treatment” or “cure” for unmanageable unsecured debts, and those with more unsecured debts are more ill
and in need of a remedy. To conclude that those most in need
have better odds of getting help is not to conclude that chapter
13 is the best option for these debtors. Chapter 7 cases nearly
always end in a discharge, and it is typically received within
four to six months of filing. While we avoid detouring into the
longstanding debate about the relative merits of chapter 7 and
chapter 13, we do think it is reassuring that the financially
worst off in terms of debt have better chances of getting debt
relief in chapter 13.
Cutting the other direction in an evaluation of chapter 13
is the variable measuring whether those who file to save their
homes are successful. While a debtor can cure an arrearage on
a mortgage without getting a discharge, prior research shows
that plan completion is a sound proxy for saving homes as a
176
general matter. The fact that those who enter chapter 13 in
175. Bankruptcy does permit a court to enter a hardship discharge before
completion of plan payments or the repayment of all unsecured debts in full
(the usual conditions for discharge). 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2012) (enumerating
the three-factor test, stating that the court may grant discharge when a debtor
cannot make payments because of circumstances for which the debtor cannot
justly be held accountable). We believe hardship discharges are rare but we
are not aware of any data.
176. Porter, supra note 5, at 141–42.
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mortgage trouble are less likely to complete plan payments
bodes badly for assessing chapter 13’s efficacy as a homesaving
tool. This is a frustrating finding, given chapter 13’s prominence in policy debates (if not in reality) as a foreclosure pre177
vention device. As we discuss below in the Implications Section, the system may be able to better sort homeowners at the
time of filing using other variables that we identify such as unaffordable housing costs and whether the household has earned
income from working adults. Further research could fruitfully
examine some of the interaction effects between such variables.
We also plan to repeat this study with cases filed in 2013 and
2014 from the ongoing CBP to assess how alternatives to chapter 13 for foreclosure prevention such as mortgage loan modifications may result in different findings.
To us, the most notable fact about the full model is not the
strength of a few influences, but the rather the absence of such.
In the final model, every variable except one—borrowed money
to cope before bankruptcy—retains statistical significance.
Chapter 13 success may have been elusive precisely because
there is no single lever to ratchet. With more than a dozen variables influencing the likelihood of discharge, it is perhaps little
wonder that numerous studies (and thousands of continuing legal education programs) have failed to pin down why debtors
178
and their attorneys chose chapter 13 over chapter 7.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In place of stale debate based largely on anecdote, this
Article offers an analysis that can guide reform of chapter 13.
The findings from our statistical models reinforce the allega179
tions that chapter 13 is complex, but can also provide boundaries for debate. Until there are larger or newer studies that
advance this analysis, policymakers should start debating the
177. For a careful assessment of whether chapter 13 is promoting sustainable homeownership, see generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and
Homeownership Risk, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 323 (2007).
178. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS,
supra note 3, at 230–70; Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Laws, Models, and Real People: Choice of Chapter in Personal Bankruptcy, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 661, 703–04 (1988) (diagraming the
numerous variables and reflecting that the image demonstrates how complex
the relationship among the factors is); Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra
note 10, at 815–16; Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978
Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 50 (1987).
179. Porter, supra note 5, at 104.
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variables that we document as particularly useful as determinants of discharge.
A. REFORM WITHOUT REVOLUTION
Empirical studies of chapter 13 have often led to calls for
180
dramatic reform, including the complete repeal of chapter 13.
Our analysis points to a number of modest interventions that
may go a long way towards improvement, including nonstatutory changes. Indeed, there are multiple determinants of
chapter 13 completion. Even if our analysis were widely accepted (and proved perfectly predictive in the future), it is unlikely
that any single reform in chapter 13 would materially improve
outcomes. This analysis shows that there is no panacea, but rather a number of possibilities for improving chapter 13. We
highlight here both some strategies and some substantive reforms.
At the most obvious level, attorneys could use our findings
to guide discussions with clients about anticipated outcomes.
Some consumers, if they knew the odds of completion with
more precision, may weigh chapter 7 more favorably. In an era
of personalized medicine and individual training, law can start
using data to provide information that is more tailored to each
client. While consumers will still bring optimism bias to the
bankruptcy decision, personalization can help people counter
such cognitive traits. Our findings are tools that lawyers could
181
use to improve client advice.

180. See William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come To Repeal Chapter 13?,
65 IND. L.J. 85 (1989); see also Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, What We Really Said About Chapter Thirteen, 5 NAT’L
ASS’N OF CHAPTER 13 TR. Q. 18 (1992) (acknowledging that their initial findings on chapter 13 in their book, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, led some to
believe the authors thought chapter 13 should be eliminated as an option for
debtors).
181. See Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors To Make Their Own
Informed Choices—A Question of Professional Responsibility, 165 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 165, 183 (1997) (“Even if a client ultimately decides to file in
chapter 13 with an unrealistically tight budget in order to make a final attempt at keeping certain property such as a home, making a realistic budget
first will ensure that the client goes forward with her eyes open, understanding the likelihood of failure. Moreover, she may save herself a significant
amount of wasted effort and stress if the process of drawing up a realistic
budget makes her realize that saving the home is not feasible and should not
be attempted.”).
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Bankruptcy law has always required that a plan be feasi182
ble for confirmation; the court must assess whether “the
debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to
183
comply with the plan.” Despite this requirement, less than
184
half of confirmed plans succeed. The odds of success are equal
to a coin flip, not a ruling on the merits based on evidence. The
experts even give outright contrary advice in some cases, such
as that a prior filing makes a successive bankruptcy more likely
185
to result in a discharge. We conclude that the feasibility
standard seems to be either underused or woefully inaccurate
186
in application.
Our model also identifies some predictors of chapter 13
success that could be added to the law or practice to improve
outcomes. For example, given the importance unaffordable
housing, this ratio could be calculated on the bankruptcy forms
and made salient. Judges interpreting the “regular income”
standard may take a more strict interpretation that favors
187
earned income if they recognized the poor outcome for nonworking debtors. We also strongly recommend that the bankruptcy forms collect self-reported race data. Without such information, the disparate racial effects that we identify for
blacks will undoubtedly go unaddressed. Any efforts to equalize
188
outcomes for blacks and non-blacks would be complex, but
182. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2012) (mandating that courts will confirm
plans where, in addition to other requirements, “the debtor will be able to
make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan”).
183. Id.
184. Some plans are dismissed prior to a confirmation hearing. These additional cases are what drive the plan completion rate to between 33% and 40%.
185. E-mail from Debra Miller, supra note 126.
186. Feasibility in chapter 13 is usually interpreted to mean “not impossible” rather than “more likely than not.” The case law focuses on whether there
is an obvious circumstance visible at the time of plan confirmation that would
make completion unusually arduous. See, e.g., In re Fantasia, 211 B.R. 420
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1997) (finding that the feasibility requirement was not satisfied when debtors offered no evidence that they could make a large balloon
payment due on their mortgage); In re Deutsch, 529 B.R. 308 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2015) (ruling that the proposed plan was not feasible because it relied on voluntary contributions of debtor’s recent boyfriend and mother to make up the
shortfall between debtor’s expenses and income); In re Eckert, 485 B.R. 77, 85
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2013) (“Generally, visionary or speculative Chapter 13 plans
will not meet the feasibility standard.”); In re Compton, 88 B.R. 166, 167
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that proposed plan that required debtor to
obtain job after expiration of unemployment benefits reduced the uncertainty
that the debtor would fail to repay).
187. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012).
188. Braucher et al., supra note 83 (discussing the implications of their
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without the data and government responsibility for assessing
the situation, the façade continues that bankruptcy is race neu189
tral.
Other reforms could be stronger. The Bankruptcy Code
could be amended to require attorney representation as a condition for chapter 13 eligibility. Such a requirement would sort
those without attorneys into chapter 7, or more problematically, deny them bankruptcy relief. While we are emphatically not
recommending that action, at least not without careful consideration of alternatives and a robust debate, our analysis is
pointed in its conclusion. We cannot close an eye to the plight of
pro se filers in chapter 13. Even if pro se filers are prevalent in
only a few districts, our data support the need for reforms in
those locations. We believe that technology may offer ways to
190
improve the resources available to pro se parties, and that
longstanding interventions in other courts, such as dedicated
191
pro se clerks, would ease debtors’ plights.
The major implication of this Article is that we can learn
more about chapter 13, and then debate how to deploy that
knowledge. We do not think our findings, taken alone, support
the repeal of chapter 13. While this was debated in the wake of
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook’s initial findings on chapter
192
13 outcomes, we seek here to explain chapter 13. Eliminating
it out of hand would be a sweeping form and require more
study and validation. That stated, we are firm in our opinion
that these findings make it inexcusable to leave chapter 13
alone under the guise that local practice is the determining factor in chapter 13 outcomes. Our analysis shows that many of

findings on attorney influence on chapter choice based on race).
189. A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1725, 1726 (2004). Indeed, when presented with a request to add race
as even an optional item to the bankruptcy forms, a member of the Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure replied that race could not
be included because the forms were limited to gathering information that was
relevant to the just administration of bankruptcy cases. E-mail from Judge
Elizabeth Perris, supra note 102.
190. Ronald W. Staudt & Marc Lauritsen, Introduction, Justice, Lawyering
and Legal Education in the Digital Age, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687 (2012) (describing contents of symposium volume that has several pieces considering
how technology can ease access to justice concerns).
191. Who Does What: Court Legal Staff, FED. JUDICIAL CENT., http://www
.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?openagent&nav=menu5b&page=/federal/
courts.nsf/page/355?opendocument (last visited Nov. 30, 2016) (describing the
routine use of pro se clerks in federal district court).
192. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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the factors that vary locally and have been deemed “the” important determinant of chapter 13 outcomes do not, in fact,
predict success.
B. DISRUPTION BY DATA
One of the goals of this Article is to disrupt the idea that
chapter 13 is impenetrably local and inexplicably varied, and
that therefore it cannot be improved on a national level. We
want to loosen the grip of the misinterpretation of local legal
culture theory on the debate about consumer bankruptcy reform, in renewing what we believe is the crucial question: can
chapter 13 law and practice be adjusted to boost its efficacy to a
level (admittedly undetermined at present) high enough to justify the complexities created by the law’s two-chapter approach
193
to consumer bankruptcy?
Our findings can outline the next set of questions. The factors that we identify as influential can guide the construction of
new research and even the limitations of our study can prompt
replication with additional variables or alternate methodolo194
gies. Our data should disrupt the idea of local legal culture.
In some ways, our call is back to the future where Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook began. Their scholarly works on chapter 13 filing rates dislodged the idea that all bankruptcy variation could be explained by the rational choices of debtors acting
with full information of their situations and the process ahead.
Indeed, we think this project is a return to the core approach of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook. With a random national sample and stronger statistical software, we can produce
an analysis of chapter 13 that eluded them. Researchers can
repeat or expand our analysis, using new samples and adding
195
statistical tools. If the findings are robust and consistent, this

193. Cf. Whitford, supra note 180, at 88 (“The argument for repealing
Chapter 13 rests on the assumption that it is not practical to alter existing
bankruptcy practice so that most consumers make an informed and selfinterested choice between Chapters 7 and 13.”).
194. For example, a prominent practitioner and past president of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Ed Boltz, suggested
that further study should add in the variation in chapter 13 trustee compensation as an important additional cost that can burden a debtor trying to complete a plan. Telephone Interview by Katherine Porter with Edward C. Boltz,
Partner, The Law Offices of John T. Orcutt, P.C., (June 5, 2015).
195. Indeed, we intend to reproduce this study using data from debtors who
filed for chapter 13 in 2013. Additionally, we know almost nothing about chap-
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Article will have provided a powerful push for reform in the directions that are most likely to prove successful.
Inspiring legal reform is difficult. Beyond the problems of
political economy, the actors themselves may resist reforms.
Judges, trustees, clerks of courts, and others may resist change,
as illustrated by efforts to soften BAPCPA and retain prior
196
practices. In a specialized system such as bankruptcy, the expert and repeat players—the judges, the attorneys, and the
trustees—are gatekeepers to reform. The difficulty has been
persuading them to move in a single direction when they believed the chapter 13 world defied rational or systemic study.
As a result, the dialogue about chapter 13 is undisciplined. The
debate diverges into proclamations that “I know success when I
197
see it,” and “chapter 13 works pretty well when I use it.” The
effect can become regional, with people resisting reforms that
would change practice in their courts. In a sleight of hand, the
198
policymaker is directed to “look under a different rock,” while
being reassured that all is well in a given area.
This approach to chapter 13 is not limited to geography.
We ourselves have studied single factors that affect chapter 13,
199
and unaffordable mortgages
respectively refiling (Greene)
200
(Porter), without looking at the larger picture. When a reform
is attempted, the defense is that there is insufficient evidence
that everybody will be better, on average or as a whole, with
changes to practices. People offer up their own local legal culture as evidence that their approach is superior, at least for
their location. Instead of a debate about whether a reform is
desirable or practicable, the discussion devolves into finger
ter 7 debtors who do not receive a discharge. While that percentage is small,
some of the same factors may be predictive of bankruptcy success.
196. Greene, supra note 148, at 256 (describing how judges interpret a
Bankruptcy Code provision intended to curb repeat filings as not requiring a
hearing, despite the explicit language of the statute, in order to avoid imposing expense on debtors and administrative burdens on courts).
197. See Nancy B. Clark, From the President, CDCBAA NEWSL. (Cent.
Dist. Consumer Bankr. Att’y Ass’n), Sept. 2015, at 1, 2 (“I do not view Chapter
13 as a ‘government program.’ In addition, I pride myself on navigating the
challenges of Chapter 13. However, I must concede that the number of dismissals out pace the number of discharges.”).
198. See Henry E. Hildebrand, III, A Response to a Pretend Solution, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2011) (providing statistics on chapter 13 outcomes in the
Middle District of Tennessee to refute characterization of chapter 13 as a pretend solution).
199. Greene, supra note 148.
200. Eggum et al., supra note 28.
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pointing about a lack of respect for difference and allegations of
turf protection.
The debate over whether a model form for the chapter 13
plan should be promulgated by the Advisory Committee on the
Rules for Bankruptcy Procedure illustrates the rhetoric. A
bankruptcy judge who organized a letter of 144 judges in opposition to the model form explained at a public hearing that the
judges were “concerned because they feel by and large that
201
Chapter 13 works in their jurisdictions.” In counter, another
judge described the problem as “local [legal] culture,” calling it
a “wonderful phrase to describe ‘what you can do is just fine,
202
just don’t do it in my back yard.’”
We are confident that this work will upset the chapter 13
community because at least some of our findings are outside
the conventional wisdom, such as regarding whether conduit
203
payments and wage orders increase plan completion. But we
are even more certain that this disruption is necessary to reset
204
the stale debate about chapter 13. The entrenchment of the
status quo is holding back reform. Without a blueprint to

201. Transcript of Proceedings at 25, In Re Bankruptcy Rules Committee
Hearing (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and
-archives-rules-committees/transcripts (download Transcript of Bankruptcy
Rules Public Hearing) [hereinafter Transcript of Proceedings] (statement of
Brian Lynch); see also PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE AND OFFICIAL FORMS: JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY RULES Tab 2 (Jan. 23,
2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules
-committees/transcripts (download Testimony submitted for Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure) (testimony
of Bryan Lynch) (“Second, despite what proponents suggest, chapter 13 works
very well in the legal communities throughout this country, and most courts
. . . think that their local chapter 13 plan and processes work well for the
needs of their debtors and creditors.”).
202. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 201, at 23 (testimony of Keith
Lundin); see also id. at 24 (“They believe in having a form. They just want
their form. And if the Committee would just adopt their form, the whole issue
would go away and everybody would be happy.”).
203. Hank Hildebrand, Comments from Hank Hildebrand on Conduit
Payments, CENT. DISTRICT INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www
.centraldistrictinsider.com/2015/09/24/comments-from-hank-hildebrand-on
-conduit-payments (“I have also had the opportunity to observe a significant
number of jurisdictions with and without the ‘conduit’ component in their
chapter 13 plans. All of us that are ‘conduit’ trustees have seen the result:
More cases complete.”).
204. In this regard, we agree with Judge Keith Lundin, that master of understatement, who pronounced that “this local culture thing” is “killing Chapter 13, but that’s just my opinion.” Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 201.
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prompt grounded debate, chapter 13 reform faces even longer
odds than chapter 13 debtors do in receiving discharges.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 13 is in the bedrock of consumer bankruptcy, with
Congress acting in each amendment after the enactment in
1978 of the Bankruptcy Code to further increase chapter 13 use
over chapter 7. But decade after decade, study after study has
documented that approximately one-in-three chapter 13 cases
205
end in a discharge. When critics have characterized this fact
as a problem that merits law reform, the theory of local legal
culture is trotted out to refute that the problem is the law it206
self. Instead, local legal culture treats the problems that
debtors suffer in chapter 13 as individual, geographically specific, cultural, and readily addressable by professionals within
the system.
Our analysis illustrates that local legal culture can be in207
corporated into empirical research to inform chapter 13. A
national sample lets us take account of local practice and demographic variations, and regression modeling lets us control
for the multiple influences on how people fare in chapter 13.
Local legal culture may be a valid partial explanation for the
widespread variation in chapter 13 practices, but it should not
be allowed to obfuscate the measurable influences on debtor
success.

205. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing a half-dozen studies
conducted in 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s).
206. See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 10, at 804 (“The significance of local legal culture is obvious.”).
207. Id. at 861 (“While data are scarce in most areas of legal policymaking,
there has been a recent trend toward statistical studies of the bankruptcy system. The data presented here about local legal cultures, however, suggest that
some caution about certain empirically based analyses of the bankruptcy system is appropriate. Many statistical analyses of bankruptcy use aggregated
data to support their assertions. Aggregated studies do not account for local
differences that might yield very different pictures about the operation of the
bankruptcy system. The usefulness of such data analyses is problematic. If local legal culture plays as strong a role in the bankruptcy process and its outcomes as these data suggest, then models that do not include indicators of local effects are incomplete. Unfortunately, some local effects are difficult to
quantify for statistical models. Researchers might use case studies and other
qualitative data to supplement statistical modeling in some cases. Without
some accounting for local variation, even those who are willing to do empirical
research may miss the underlying reality.” (internal citations omitted)).
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This Article is the first analysis to bring together three
crucial elements: (1) an individual-level, national sample of
hundreds of cases; (2) dozens of variables that recognize the
multiple actors and processes that shape bankruptcy practice;
and (3) regression modeling that accounts for local effects. We
construct statistical models that draw on our contextual
knowledge of chapter 13 and leading theories of financial distress from law and sociology. The result is a list of factors that
can be the guideposts for debates about whether reform is
needed to chapter 13.
The poor outcome for the majority of chapter 13 debtors is
not immutable. Though additional research and normative debate is needed to chart the best opportunities to improve chapter 13, we hope our study sparks a fiery debate, smothered for
the last decades by local legal culture. While bankruptcy may
never be as “uniform” as contemplated by the U.S. Constitu208
tion, the law can better serve its goals of rehabilitating debtors and repaying creditors by looking across local variation to
identify levers for reform.

208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

